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NOTES
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
INSTRUMENTALITIES AND OBLIGATIONS*
IN an era when a foreign sovereign's immunity from municipal jurisdic-
tion amounted simply to protection of diplomatic representatives' and naval
vessels,2 liberal dispensation of the privilege rarely frustrated the rights and
remedies of individuals. But the multiplication of government instrumentalities
since the World War, together with the acceleration of international inter-
course, has brought increasing numbers of foreign government ships and
corporations into municipal jurisdictions, inducing many courts to carve
exceptions into the rule of unlimited sovereign immunity.3 Departure from
the tradition of full immufiity, which automatically obviated diplomatic re-
percussions, has in turn produced the delicate problem of gearing judicial
decisions to the more significant manifestations of national foreign policy.4
Immunity was freely granted by Anglo-American courts long after the
Continental tribunals moved to confine its bounds. 5 Traditional justification
for the broad privilege was a desire to preserve comity and international good-
will by paying tribute to the dignity and independence of foreign sovereigns.0
Courts have also been impressed by the theoretical impossibility of execut-
ing judgments against sovereigns or their subsidiaries except through diplo-
* Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 36 F. Supp. 503 (E. D. N. Y. 1941); Hannes v.
Kingdom of Rounania Monopolies Inst., 260 App. Div. 189, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 825 (1st
Dep't 1940).
1. REv. STAT. § 4063 (1878), 22 U. S. C. § 252 (1934); Auer v. Costa, 23 F. Stipp.
22 (D. Mass. 1938).
2. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch. 116 (U. S. 1812); cf. Mexico
v. Rask, 118 Cal. App. 21, 4 P. (2d) 981 (1931).
3. For a compendium of foreign and United States decisions see Draft Convention
on the Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States (1932) 26 Am~x. J. INT. L.
Supp. 475 et seq. (bound in HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1931) 315).
See also Hervey, The Immunity of Foreign States When Engaged in Commercial En-
terprises: A Proposed Solution (1928) 27 MIcH. L. REv. 751; Hayes, Private Claihs
Against Sovereigns (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 599. Cf. Borchard, Government Liability
in Tort (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229; (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 1, 757, 1039.
4. See Dak, Sovereign Immunity and the New York Court of Appeals (1940)
40 COL. L. REv. 453; Feller, Procedure in Cases Involving Immunities of Foreign States
in Courts of the United States (1931) 25 Am. J. INT. L. 83.
5. The Pesaro, 271 U. S. 562 (1926); Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunlig Jar-
nvagsstyrelsen, 43 F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United
States, 71 F. (2d) 524 (C. C. P. A. 1934); Oliver Trading Co. v. Mexico, 5 F. (2d)
659 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924). The European decisions are collected in Brinton, Suits Against
Foreign States (1931) 25 Am. J. INT. L. 50.
6. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch. 116 (U. S. 1812); The
Parlement Beige, 5 P. D. 197 (1880).
1941] NOTES 1089
matic devices, the ultimate of which is war.7 And a desire for reciprocal
privileges and a related fear of reprisals are often strong motivations.
But the competitive advantage over private domestic ships and corpora-
tions afforded to foreign sovereign subsidiaries under the cloak of immunity
seems unjustifiable.8 Difficulty of execution is absent in the usual case be-
ginning with the attachment of funds 9 or the libelling of a ship.' More-
over, there is no record of any serious diplomatic reprisal resulting from an
exercise of jurisdiction."' And the suggestion that a casus bdli might accrue
seems unrealistic. Finally, the makeshift diplomatic remedy held out to those
injured by foreign sovereign instrumentalities or owed money by them is
even clumsier and less certain than the legislative redress available to those
who would sue domestic sovereigns. 2
It is therefore only natural that some American courts have recently at-
tacked immunity on both the substantive and procedural levels. As a matter
of substantive law they have employed a distinction between private-com-
mercial and public functions of foreign sovereigns' ships and instrumentali-
ties-jure gestionis as distingnished from jure intperil.'3 To implement the
distinction definitional criteria have been evolved. The immunity of a for-
eign ship has turned upon its government ownership and possession as well
as its public use.'4 Foreign corporate instrumentalities have been examined
to determine whether or not their functions could be performed by private
entities.', Courts have also looked to stock ownership, legal title, the ulti-
mate beneficiary of profits, and juristic status in its own municipal courts
as indicia of the jure gestionis of instrumentalities.'0
7. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunlig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A.
2d, 1930). But cf. The Florence H., 248 Fed. 1012 (S. D. N. Y. 1918). Uncollectibility
of judgments should not bar jurisdiction. See Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U. S. 565
(1918); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 720 (U. S. 183).
8. See The Attualita, 238 Fed. 909, 911 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916) ; Hayes, supra note 3,
at 599.
9. E.g., Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 36 F. Supp. 503 (E. D. N. Y. 1941) ; Ulen
& Co. v. Bank Gospodarstwva Krajowego, 24 N.Y. S. (2d) 201 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1940).
10. E.g., Ervin v. Quintanilla, 99 F. (2d) 935 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), cert. denied, 306
U. S. 635 (1939); 3e-,ico v. Rask, 118 Cal. App. 21, 4 P. (2d) 981 (1931).
11. "Embarrassment" seems to be the essence of the diplomatic difficulty to be anti-
cipated in the ordinary suit. JAFFE, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF I-TEn.AT1:NAL Lw (1933)
51. But see p. 1092 infra.
12. See Brinton, supra note 5, at 60; JAFFE, op. cit. supra note 11, at 210; The
Pesaro, 277 Fed. 473, 485 (S. D. N. Y. 1921), rev'd, 271 U. S. 562 (1926).
13. See AL.LF, THE PoslxnoN oF FOREIGN STATES BEaroR N.TroN A. Couras (1931)
48; Ulen & Co. v. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 201 (App Div.
2d Dep't 1940); Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Inst., 260 App. Div. 189,
20 N.Y. S. (2d) 825 (1st Dep't 1940). See also United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat
Gesellschaft, 31 F. (2d) 199 (S.D. N.Y. 1929).
14. The Pesaro, 271 U. S. 562 (1926); The Roseric, 254 Fed. 154 (D. N. J. 1918);
see Mexico v. Rask, 118 Cal. App. 21, 4 P. (2d) 981 (1934).
15. See Brinton, supra note 5, at 60.
16. Compare Bradford v. Director General of the Railroads, 2778 S. NV. 251 (Te.
Giv. App., 1925) with Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania 'Monopolies Inst., 260 App. Div.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The dichotomy may be an adequate device to restrict excessive privileges
of immunity for ships and corporations. But these definitions do not en-
compass those important situations in which a sovereign's funds on deposit
in the jurisdiction, already appropriated and designated for the payment of
specified bonds or obligations, are attached in order to establish quasi in rein
jurisdiction over the public obligations or bonds in question.1" Moreover, it
has often been impossible for a stakeholder to interplead to establish owner-
ship of a fund where a sovereign is one claimant unless the sovereign invokes
the jurisdiction as plaintiff and is met with a counter-claim' 8 or makes a gen-
eral appearance in defense.19 Even if a sovereign, in order to gain the con-
fidence of its creditors, expressly contracted to submit disputes to American
courts, or to arbitrate here, no jurisdiction could be established in a specific
action without consent. 20 Only where the sovereign is cestui que trust of
real property, have American courts exercised jurisdiction over title claims
without regard to the sovereign's beneficial interest.
21
European courts, recognizing the inequity and uselessness, as a matter of
diplomacy, of automatically vitiating contracts to submit to jurisdiction and
of frustrating litigants' remedies simply because a sovereign might be a party
at interest, have transcended the doctrinal confines of the public-private con-
cept. Contracts consenting to suit or arbitration have been enforced. 22 Fur-
thermore, a sovereign's participation in commercial enterprise has become
merely one kind of implied waiver of immunity. 23 A sovereign agreeing to
make payments on its obligations or making deposits requisite to such pay-
189, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 825 (1st Dep't 1940) and Coale v. Soci6t6 Cooperative Suisse du
Charbons, 21 F. (2d) 180 (S. D. N. Y. 1921). See Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J.
1463, 1466; Hervey, supra note 3, at 751.
17. Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 36 F. Supp. 503 (E. D. N. Y. 1941). The court
apparently declined to take jurisdiction in this case because of diplomatic exigencies
suggested by the State Department. Given a different political climate, courts moved
by the sordid record of South American bonds, for instance, may seek to exercise juris-
diction in this fashion for the protection of investors. Cf. Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
281 N. Y. 362, 24 N. E. (2d) 81 (1939). The issue is currently raised in a case of po-
litical importance where the refugee Belgian government seeks to attach gold held by the
Federal Reserve Bank in New York, belonging to France. Banque Nationale de Bel-
gique v. Banque de France, N. Y. Sup. Ct. (complaint filed Feb. 5, 1941).
18. Compare Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co., 250 Fed. 341 (C. C. A.
2d, 1918), cert. denied, 246 U. S. 663 (1918) with United States v. Guaranty Trust Co.,
304 U. S. 126 (1938). See Chase Nat. Bank v. Bankierskantoor Albert Graef, N. Y.
Sup. Ct. (complaint filed Dec. 30, 1940).
19. See Richardson v. Fajardo Sugar Co., 241 U. S. 44 (1915) ; cf. Ervin v. Quin-
tanilla, 99 F. (2d) 935 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939), cert. denied, 306 U. S. 635 (1939).
20. Hewitt v. Spreyer, 250 Fed. 367 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) ; Duff v. Kelantan [1924]
A. C. 797.
21. Sharp's Rifle Mfg. Co. v. Rowan, 34 Conn. 329 (1867); cf. United States v.
Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882).
22. See cases collected and translated in Draft Convention on the Competence of
Courts in Regard to Foreign States, supra note 3, at 553-555, 557, 558.
23. Id. at 604-605. Cf. Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat.
904, 906 (1824).
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ment is also deemed to have waived immunity and to have consented to quasi-
in-rem jurisdiction.24 The refusal of American courts to implement its exist-
ing doctrine with the approach of these European decisions leaves a signifi-
cant and inexpedient hiatus in the efforts to restrict unnecessary immunity.
The timidity of American courts in regard to substantive restrictions has
not been reflected, however, in the strict procedural limitations which some
courts have imposed upon sovereigns claiming immunity25 under the public-
'private doctrine. Where a suit involves a sovereign directly as a named and
indispensable party defendant, the courts will take judicial notice of its
claim upon an informal suggestion from the sovereign's diplomatic representa-
tive or from an amicus curiae.2 But if there is "apparent jurisdiction"
-in rem where a ship is libelled, in personam against a government corpora-
tion or non-diplomatic agent, or quasi in rem over other attachable property
-the sovereign must now maintain the burden of proving judicially its in-
strumentality's right to immunity.2 7 Moreover, the procedure for presenting
this proof has been specially prescribed.2 8 Should the sovereign seek to pre-
sent its claim and proof directly, only a special appearance by its ranking
diplomatic representative will satisfy the ritual. If the sovereign deems such
a special appearance beneath its dignity, the so-called "suggestion" procedure
whereby the sovereign may lodge a claim with the State Department to be
relayed to the court through the Department of Justice and its district attor-
ney in the form of a "suggestion" of immunity is usually available. Only
one possible escape remains: the Supreme Court has said that where the
State Department recognizes and allows the claim, it is the duty of a court
to abdicate its jurisdiction automatically without requiring the proof which
might ordinarily be demanded.2 9
Recent New York cases, however, threaten to reduce even this last redoubt
of automatic immunity without proof.30 The difficulty in determining what
claims are "recognized and allowed" stems from the State Department cus-
tom of addressing the courts in the ambiguous idiom which is the language
of diplomacy.3' The Department has persisted in an almost uniform "sug-
gestion," irrespective of political circumstances, which relates the claim
24. See cases collected in Draft Con'ention on the Competence of Courts in Regard
to Foreign States, stpra note 3, at 551-560.
25. See Feller, szpra note 4, at 83; Dfak, supra note 4, at 456 et seq.
26. Puente v. Spanish National State, 116 F. (2d) 43 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); The Sao
Vicente, 260 U. S. 151 (1922).
27. See Ex parte Muir, 254 U. S. 522, 533 (1921); Puente v. Spanish National
State, 116 F. (2d) 43, 45 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
28. See Ex parte Muir, 254 U. S. 522, 533 (1921); Feller, mspra note 4.
29. The Navemar, 303 U. S. 68, 74 (1938).
30. Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 N. Y. 362, 24 N. E. (2d) 81 (1939), dis-
cussed by D~ak, supra note 4. Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Inst., 260
App. Div. 189, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 825 (1st Dep't 1940).
31. E.g., "In reply to your inquiry you are informed that the State Department
would not have had the representations of the Brazilian Ambassador presented to the
Court had it felt that they were without merit." Unreported communication from State
Department to counsel for defendant in Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo. See also letters
in Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 36 F. Supp. 503, 504, 505 (E. D. N. Y. 1941).
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received but conspicuously omits the apt words and contains a disclaimer of
any desire to encroach upon or influence the jurisdiction of the court.
2
As a result, there have been two mutually exclusive and incomplete inter-
pretations of this ambiguous pro forma suggestion. Construing the language
at face value, the New York courts have conceived the usual suggestion as
no more than an alternative to a special appearance by which the sovereign
indirectly lays his claim before the court subject to its independent judg-
ment.33 Under this view the State Department becomes a mere "conduit."'
Actual transmission of the claim is not deemed a certification.
Insofar as this interpretation whittles away at automatic immunity, it is
a commendable extension of the general movement to limit immunity. But
other courts, apparently recognizing the hazards of judgments which encour-
age diplomatic complications, have decreed immunity automatically upon
receipt of vague suggestions bearing allegations which probably would not
support a plea upon special appearance.3 4 Actually, however, the State
Department considers its suggestions more than perfunctory courtesies -a
fact demonstrated by refusals to comply with requests that it suggest where
it disapproves of granting immunity 35 and by the custom of transmitting
suggestions in support of, as well as in lieu of, special appearances. 0
This unfortunate split of decisions, threatening vital foreign relations
in some jurisdictions and breeding unnecessary immunities in others, could
readily be resolved by the State Department's articulation of its position
through the apt words "recognized and allowed." Justification for contin-
ued ambiguity is unconvincing. It has been argued that the establish-
ment of conclusive "communications" between the Department and the
courts would deprive the Department of its traditional apology to foreign
32. See D~ak, supra note 4, at 459. Cf. Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 N. Y.
362, 373, 24 N. E. (2d) 81, 86 (1939) ; The Navemar, 303 U. S. 68, 74 (1938) ; Hannes
v. Roumanian Monopolies Inst., 260 App. Div. 189, 191, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 825, 828 (1st
Dep't 1940) ; Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 36 F. Supp. 503, 504 (E. D. N. Y. 1941).
33. Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 N. Y. 362, 24 N. E. (2d) 81 (1939).
34. E.g., Ervin v. Quintanilla, 99 F. (2d) 935 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), cert. denied,
306 U. S. 635 (1939). In Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, the court, pursuant to the
State Department's suggestion, refused to attach funds in the hands of Sao Paulo's fiscal
agent designated for service of the very bonds the plaintiff held. The court held, not as a
"matter of law" but because of "comity," that Sao Paulo was entitled to immunity even
though it lacked "external" sovereignty. Immunity has generally been accorded American
states and even territories, irrespective of external sovereignty. Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U. S. 313 (1934) ; Kawananakoa v. Polybiank, 205 U. S. 349, 353 (1906). But the
great weight of foreign decisions and the one American case on the question have not
granted immunity to political subdivisions of foreign states. See Leubrie v. State of Sao
Paulo, 97 N. Y. L. J. 2160 (April 30, 1937). The European cases are collected in Draft
Convention on the Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States, supra note 3,
at 483-488.
35. E.g., The Pesaro, 277 Fed. 473, 479 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Molina v. Comision
Reguladora del Meriado de Henequen, 91 N. J. L. 382, 103 Atl. 397 (1918); cf. The
Maipo, 252 Fed. 627, 628 (S. D. N. Y. 1918) ; The Navemar, 303 U. S. 68 (1938).
36. E.g., Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 36 F. Supp. 503 (E. D. N. Y. 1941) ; Lamont
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 N.Y. 362, 24 N.E. (2d) 81 (1939).
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NOTES
nations injured by the courts or the states-that the Department has no cn-
trol under the Federal system.3 7 But precise and mandatory language could
be reserved for the special situation where court decisions might impair
definite diplomatic objectives and policies. 38 In all other cases the Depart-
ment's suggestion would permit determination of a sovereign's claim under
the "conduit theory."
The notion that "dictation" by the Department would violate the principle
of separation of powers3 9 reflects a misconception of the intrinsic nature of
an affirmative as distinguished from a mere "conduit" suggestion. The affir-
mative suggestion is not on its face an attempt by the State Department to
substitute its own legal opinion, either of the facts or of the law, so as to
encroach upon the judicial function of the courts.40 The affirmative sugges-
tion should be considered, instead, as a finding of diplomatic necessity by the
State Department in the exercise of its responsibility for foreign affairs
which should govern the courts whenever the executive deems conformity
necessary to the administration of foreign relations. Far from violating the
concept of separation of powers, such cooperation would be consistent with
the traditional abstinence of the courts from political questions 4' and with
the policy of the incumbent Supreme Court to give full credence to the Con-
gress and the Executive in their respective spheres of responsibility.4 '
The view that decisions touching delicate foreign relations should con form
to the policies of the Executive has long been recognized in England and on
the Continent as a necessary corollary to strict construction of sovereign
immunity,4 3 presumably because of the greater significance of diplomatic
relations to those "unisolated" countries. The changing positiun of foreign
affairs on the American stage seems to justify a brake upon the widening
limitations of sovereign immunity in the form of a clear conceptual device
with'-which to draw special exceptions upon demand of the State Depart-
ment.
37. See The Florence H., 248 Fed. 1012, 1017 (S. D. N. Y. 1918). See also J,%M, op.
cit. supra note 11, at 40; D6ak, supra note 4, at 461.
38. See JAFFE, op. cit. supra note 11, at 38.
39. JAFFE, Op. cit. supra note 11, at 78; cf. Black, J., concurring in Z. & F. Assets
Realization Corp. v. Hull, 61 S. Ct. 351, 356 (U. S. 1941).
40. In the Sullivan case the court, relying upon informal correspondence in which
the State Department amplified its bare suggestion, found that "finality" should be ac-
corded the executive's "recognition" of claimant's "fads." But see The Maipo, 252 Fed.
627 (S. D. N. Y. 1918).
41. See Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 212 (1890) ; Agency of Canadian Car
Co. v. American Can Co., 253 Fed. 152 (S. D. N. Y. 1918), afl'd, 258 Fed. 363 (C. C. A.
2d, 1919).
42. E.g., Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 61 S. Ct. 351 (U. S. 1941). Cer-
tification of a claim by the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Treasury under War
Claims Act was held not a mere "notarial" or ministerial act, but rather conclusive upon
the courts. 'Mr. Justice Black, concurring, at 358, emphasizes the exclusive responsibility
of the Executive in the "momentous question of public policies affecting this nation's
relations with the other countries of the world."
43. Factor v. Globe Venture Syndicate, [1900] 1 Ch. 811, 814; Duff v. Kelantan,
[1924] A. C. 797.
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STATE LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAL EQUITY JURISDICTION*
ALTHOUGH federal courts have frequently asserted that state statutes and
decisions may neither enlarge' nor limit 2 federal equity jurisdiction, there
has been a marked difference between their doctrinal pronouncements and
the results they have reached. The decisions often reveal a policy of enlarging
federal equity jurisdiction by enforcing state-created substantive rights, 4 as
well as a refusal to enforce similarly created remedies.5 Federal equity juris-
diction has been limited, moreover, in order to avoid conflict between courts
over a single res6 and to further intergovernmental comity.7 The relation-
ship of both these principles of federal equity jurisdiction is illustrated in
Kelleamt v. Maryland Casualty Company s recently decided by the Supreme
Court.
Kelleam, with the Maryland Casualty Company as surety on his bond, had
acted as administrator in an Oklahoma probate proceeding. As a result of
that action, the entire estate was distributed between Kelleam and his sister,
who were the only full blood heirs, and the surety was discharged on its
bond. Alleging that the decree had been fraudulently procured by the full
blood heirs, the half blood heirs brought an action in the Oklahoma court to
set it aside. When their complaint was dismissed on demurrer, they appealed.
While this appeal was pending, the surety, noting that the full bloods had
transferred part of the property received from the estate, joined both full
bloods and half bloods as defendants in an action in the federal district court,
basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. The surety sought exonera-
tion from its principal, Kelleam, on its bond and appointment of a receiver
to conserve the remaining assets pending the outcome of the state appeal;
it subsequently amended its complaint to allege fraud on the part of the
full blood heirs in the probate proceeding. The half bloods, by cross' peti-
tion, had alleged the same fraud, and had also asked for a receiver. The full
bloods pleaded, inter alia, lack of federal jurisdiction pending appeal in the
state court, and moved to dismiss both the bill of complaint and the cross
petition. The district court overruled this motion, and determined that the
*Kelleam v. Maryland Casualty Co., 61 Sup. Ct. 595 (U. S. 1941).
1. Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106 (1891) ; Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 451 (1893).
2. Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 202 (1893).
3. "Federal equity jurisdiction" relates to the power of the Federal courts to
grant equitable relief. It is not synonymous with jurisdiction in the strict sense, i.e., the
existence of the requisite amount, or diversity of citizenship. See (1923) 33 YALE L. J.
193, n. 2; Von Moschzisker, Equity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts (1927) 75 U. or
PA. L. REv. 287. The assertion that federal equity jurisdiction may not be enlarged or
limited by the states has served largely as a doctrinal device to preserve a national equity
uniform in all the states.
4. Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195 (U. S. 1839); Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15
(1884); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 234 U. S. 369 (1914).
5. Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491 (1923) ; California Prune & Apricot
Growers' Ass'n v. Catz Amer. Co., 60 F. (2d) 788 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); ef. Scott v.
Neely, 140 U. S. 106 (1891) ; Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 451 (1893).
6. Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36 (1928).
7. See note 18 infra.
8. 61 Sup. Ct. 595 (U. S. 1941).
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probate decree was obtained by fraud and that there had been fraudulent
transfers by the full blood heirs. The court exonerated the surety on its
bond, appointed a receiver to conserve the remaining assets, and ordered the
full blood heirs to account. This decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.9
Holding the exercise of equity jurisdiction in these circumstances to be in-
appropriate, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions. Inas-
much as the claim of the surety was wholly contingent, 0 the Court concluded
that no right to primary relief had been asserted to which the receivership
was an appropriate ancillary measure." Moreover, even if the bill of com-
plaint had been sustained,'- the district court could not appropriately deter-
mine the issue of fraud in the probate proceeding because of the pending
state action.
Federal district courts, having no original probate jurisdiction, have re-
frained from interfering with the administrator's possession of the estate
or with the actual disposition of the estate in the probate court.13 But actions
to set aside probate decrees on grounds of fraud have in the past been enter-
tained by federal courts in inter partes actions, 14 even where jurisdiction was
expressly conferred by statute upon a particular state court. 3 The granting
of relief in such situations was justified on the grounds that federal equity
9. 112 F. (2d) 940 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940).
10. The Court termed the action one in equity for exoneration. It could likewise
have considered it an action for a declaratory judgment and determined the rights of
the surety even though contingent. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Oil & Coal
Co., 61 Sup. Ct. 510 (U. S. 1941).
11. It is often asserted in federal equity practice that a receivership does not consti-
tute an end in itself but may be used only as a protective measure where other relief is
sought. Usually some final disposition of the property must be contemplated before a
receiver will be appointed. SImKiNs, FEDERAL PRAcTc (3d e. 1938) 568-9. However,
the principle that a receivership may not serve as an end in itself had its development par-
ticularly in the administration of debtors' estates. Utilization of the receivership as a
device for delaying creditors called for some restrictive measures. Wqiere these consid-
erations are not present, as in the principal case, application of the doctrine may not be
appropriate.
12. Since the surety's bill of complaint should have been dismissed, the court had no
jurisdiction to determine the merits of the controversy between the full blood and half
blood heirs raised by the cross petition. No diversity of citizenship existed between the
heirs. However, if the surety's bill of complaint had been sustained, the court could have
determined the issues raised by the cross petition if no state proceeding had been pend-
ing. The diversity of citizenship between the surety and the heirs would have supported
the whole action. Ames Realty Co. v. Big Indian Mining Co., 146 Fed. 166 (C. C.
D. Mont. 1906). See 1 MooaE, FEDERAL PRAcrzc- (1938) 726-7.
13. Stansbury v. Koss, 10 F. Supp. 477 (S. D. N. Y. 1931).
14. Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U. S. 86 (1889); Case of Broderick's Will, 88 U. S.
503 (1874) ; Sawyer v. White, 122 Fed. 223 (C. C A. 8th, 1903). See Gaines v. Fuentes,
92 U. S. 10, 20 (1875).
15. McDermott v. Hannon, 203 Fed. 1015 (W. D. N. Y. 1913); Wart v. Wart,
117 Fed. 766 (C. C. Iowa 1902). Where, however, the proceeding is merely supplemental
or ancillary to the probate action, it may not be entertained by the federal courts. Sut-
ton v. English, 246 U. S. 199 (1918) ; cf. Farrell v. O'Brien, 199 U. S. 89 (1905).
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jurisdiction may not be limited by state statutes and that the equitable decree
operated only against the parties, not against the state court or against the
res.1 ' Where a state proceeding was pending, adjudication of the fraud issue
in the federal courts constituted a successful bar in the state court, prevent-
ing it from determining an issue with which it might be more familiar. The
relinquishment of jurisdiction by federal courts in such situations thus seems
highly advisable. The instant decision is in harmony with the well-defined
tendency of the present Court to preserve "the rightful independence of state
governments" where comity so demands. 17 The Court has often wisely in-
sisted upon this principle where local matters are involved.'8 Application of
the comity rule to the situation involved in the principal case seems equally
salutary, for the administration of estates in probate is closely controlled by
state statutes correlated to the mechanism of state courts. Extension of the
rule would seem desirable even where the state proceeding was initiated after
the federal action, or where the state statute has expressly conferred juris-
diction upon a particular state court. While technically a limitation on federal
equity jurisdiction, the rule of comity may well be invoked to permit inde-
pendent state control over such actions.
Although the decision could have been rested solely on the comity ground,
the court seems to have relied more heavily upon a different basis. Its con-
clusion was premised on the fact that the surety had no present right in the
federal courts to exoneration on its bond. 19 Hence the receivership was
termed an end in itself for the protection of the surety's contingent liability
and was not ancillary to some form of primary relief.20 In reaching this
16. See Farrell v. O'Brien, 199 U. S. 89, 110 (1905); Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S.
10, 21 (1875).
17. Cf. Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Pullman Co., 61 Sup. Ct. 643 (U. S. 1941);
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478 (1940); Palmer v. Massachusetts,
308 U.S. 79 (1939).
18. In Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176 (1935), equity jurisdiction based on
diversity of citizenship had been assumed by a federal district court and receivers ap-
pointed in liquidating a state building and loan association. The Supreme Court directed
that federal jurisdiction be surrendered, on comity grounds, after intervention by a
state administrative officer charged by a detailed state statute with the winding up of
such institutions. Cf. Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 189 (1935) ;
Gordon v. Washington, 295 U. S. 30 (1935) ; General Baking Co. v. Harr, 85 F. (2d)
932 (C. C. A. 3d, 1936). Equity jurisdiction apparently need not be relinquished by the
federal courts, however, if the remedy in the state is not deemed adequate or if delay or
mismanagement appears in state administration. Intermountain Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Gallegos, 78 F. (2d) 972 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935). The Court has also indicated an inten-
tion to refrain from entertaining actions dealing with issues relating to the creation of
corporations. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U. S. 123 (1933). A policy of non-
intervention has been adopted in federal question cases involving the enforcement of
state statutes. Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, 272 U. S. 525 (1926) ; Fenner v.
Boykin, 271 U. S. 240 (1926) ; cf. Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1932).
19. In determining whether the surety had a right of action, the court adopted the
old equity practice permitting the surety to sue for exoneration only after the debt had
become due. 4 PomERoy, EQuITY JUISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) § 1417.
20. See note 11 mtpra.
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result, the Court refused to enforce an Oklahoma statute permitting a surety
to bring an action for indemnity against the principal debtor before the debt
is actually due.21 Nor would it give effect to the state statute authorizing the
appointment of receivers in situations similar to that in the instant case.-
The reason given by the Court for its refusal to enforce these two Oklahoma
statutes was that they were considered remedial and could not enlarge fed-
eral equity jurisdiction.
The confusing doctrine that state statutes creating remedies, as distinct
from those establishing substantive rights, may not enlarge the equity juris-
diction of federal courts was restated and affirmed in Puscy & Jones Co. -.
Hanssen.23 The Delaware statute there involved provided that a contract
creditor might bring a bill for a receivership before reducing his claim to
judgment. The Supreme Court refused to follow the statute on two grounds.
It held that the authorization of a receivership created only a remedy affect-
ing equitable procedure, and was unrelated to any substantive right.24 It also
determined that the creditor had to exhaust his remedy on the law side of
the federal courts by reducing his claim to judgment before the equitable
claim could arise; otherwise, the objecting debtor would be deprived of its
right to a trial by jury.
In general, state statutes providing for relief in equity where an adequate
remedy accomplishing the same result existed on the law side of the federal
courts were termed remedial and not enforced in federal equity courts.2 5
But the action, insofar as it was based upon the legal claim, could be trans-
ferred to the law side and enforced there.2 6 The Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
21. OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1938) tit. 12, § 1103 provides: "A surety may maintain an
action against his principal, to obtain indemnity against the debt or liability for which he
is bound, before it is due, whenever any of the grounds e.xist, upon which . . . an order
may be made for arrest and bail and for an attachment." OfMA. STT'T. AN;. (1938) tit.
12, § 1107 apparently restates the common law right of the surety to exoneratiun, after the
debt has matured, by an action to compel the principal debtor to pay.
22. OK"L. STAT. ANN. (1938) tit. 12, § 1551 provides, in part, that a receiver may
be appointed for the benefit of any party " . . whose right to or interest in the property
or fund, or the proceeds thereof, is probable, and where it is shown that the property or
fund is in danger of being lost, removed or materially injured."
23. 261 U. S. 491 (1923). The case has been criticized in (1923) 33 YALE L J.
193; (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 589. See also (1936) 49 HARv. L. Rsv. 950.
24. A lower federal court had previously construed the statute as substantive in na-
ture. Jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co., 123 Fed. 506 (C. C. D. Del. 1903). A Delaware
court subsequently indicated that the statute created a substantive right in equity. Mac-
kenzie Oil Co. v. Omar Oil & Gas Co., 14 Del. Ch. 36, 120 Atl. 852 (1923).
25. Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford, 281 U. S. 121 (1930) ; Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S.
106 (1891); Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146 (1891). The Judiciary Act of 1789
forbade equity suits when the remedy at law was "plain, adequate and complete." 28 U.
S. C. §384 (1935). This has been construed to mean an adequate remedy at law in the
federal, not in the state courts. Risty v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 270 U. S. 378 (1926);
Matthews v. R6dgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1932). Cf. Russell v. Todd, 309 U. S. 280 (1940).
26. Denison v. Keck, 13 F. (2d) 384 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Adams v. Jones, 11 F.
(2d) 759 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926). This practice was introduced by the 1912 Equity Rules
22 and 23. Initially actions were dismissed without prejudice to a suit at law.
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cedure have, however, obviated this aspect of the Pusey & Jones case by
abolishing procedural distinctions between law and equity.27 Hence the chief
distinction between an equitable and legal action under the Rules lies in deter-
mining whether the party is entitled to a jury trial as of right.28 But the
other aspect of the Pusey & Jones case-that the statute authorizing the ap-
pointment of a receiver affected only equitable procedure instead of creating
a substantive right-remains important despite the Federal Rules.2D Even
under the Rules federal courts will refuse to enforce procedural remedies
arising from state statutes, although they will enforce state-created substan-
tive rights.
In this aspect the distinction between substance and procedure, although
confusing, is flexible and depends upon the particular situation involved.30
In the Kelleam case, for example, there is substantial harmony between the
results following from the comity argument and from the analysis in terms
of the established substantive-remedial dichotomy. Since the comity principle
would seem a better basis upon which to justify the decision, the Court's
assertion that the statute creating a right of action in the surety before the
debt was actually due was remedial can be viewed as merely re-enforcement
for its decision. If a surety sought exoneration in a federal court today under
the statute in a situation where the action did not interfere with a pending
state proceeding relating to matters better left to state determination, the
statute should be enforced as substantive. At common law the surety could
maintain an action against his principal debtor only after the surety had paid
part of the debt to the creditors.31 Equity early adopted the practice of per-
mitting the surety to bring a bill for exoneration, after the debt had ma-
tured, compelling the principal debtor to pay.32 The Oklahoma statute in-
volved in the principal case changed the common law rule by permitting an
action to afford the surety protection even though the debt had not yet be-
come due. 33 Consequently, it would seem to have created a substantial right
27. The principal case arose prior to the effective date of the new Federal Rules for
Civil Procedure.
28. If the factual situation involved in the Pusey & Jones case arose today, complete
relief could be afforded in a federal civil action. The objecting debtor could obtain a
trial by jury oil the validity of the claim while the creditor would be afforded relief
equitable in nature.
29. See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 210.
30. See Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws (1933) 42 YALE
L. J. 333.
31. See ARANT, SURETYSHIP (1931) 318-19; 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
(4th ed. 1919) § 1417.
32. Ranelaugh v. Hayes, 1 Vern. 189, 23 Eng. Rep. 405 (1683); Norton v. Reid &
Sutton, 11 S. C. 593 (1867). This equitable right was developed as a protective measure
to enable the surety to remove the cloud which hung over him by virtue of the debt.
It prevented an unnecessary withdrawal of capital before the surety could maintain his
action against the principal debtor.
33. See note 21 supra. Under this statute the surety was afforded greater protection
through an action to indemnify himself against the principal debtor even before the debt
was due. Thus he could obtain relief if the principal debtor attempted fraudulent evasion
of the debt through transfer or dissipation of the property.
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in the surety which would be enforceable in the federal courts in the absence
of the compulsion of the comity rule.
If the right of action created by the statute were thus enforced as substan-
tive in the federal courts, the appointment of a receiver would be considered
an appropriate ancillary measure.34 A conservation receivership would seem
necessary where the surety could show fraudulent transfers, as in the prin-
cipal case, or threatened dissipation of the property. Moreover, whether or
not the receivership is considered an appropriate ancillary remedy raises the
further problem of the effect of Eric R. R. v. Tompkins.m' The opinion in
the instant case contains no discussion of the Toinpkins case and also over-
looks the state cases which construe the Oklahoma statute30 authorizing the
appointment of receivers in situations analogous to that presented in the prin-
cipal case. But application of the Tompkins case to equitable matters has been
established in certain instances.37 Federal courts apparently will determine
independently what is substantive and what procedural under the Tompkins
case, but have indicated a broad policy of conforming to state laws in shap-
ing relief.38 The implication in the Kclleam case, however, is that the Tamp-
kins rule will not be given such expansive effect in all situations. Under this
holding, the determination in the Pusey & Jones case that statutes authoriz-
ing the appointment of receivers merely create remedies affecting equitable
procedure seemingly will control in the federal courts. 9 The enforcement
of such statutes, in view of the Tompkins case, would seem more desirable.
Such enforcement would not conflict with the Federal Rules. Under Rule 64,
state law is made controlling in granting provisional remedies in actions at
law. Rule 66, providing that the administration of equity receiverships shall
be in accordance with the former practice in the federal courts, does not
specifically mention appointment of receivers. Consequently, substantial con-
formity with state law in appointing receivers, analogous to Rule 64, appears
a desirable method of solving the substantive-remedial dilemma.
34. See Glades County v. Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co., 57 F. (2d) 449, 452 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1932).
35. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
36. See note 22 supra.
37. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208 (1939); Ruhlin v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202 (1938). See (1941) 41 CL- L. REv. 104, 106, n. 15.
38. See, e.g., Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 20S (1939); Sampson v.
Channell, 110 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
39. Even though the construction of the particular state statute involved in the prin-
cipal case be doubtful, yet the tenor of the Court's opinion indicated that it vas termed
"remedial" as a result of federal determination. It wN-as not go termed because state
courts had given it that construction. The receivership statute involved in the Puscj, &
Jones case had been construed as substantive by the Delaware Chancery Court. See note
24 supra.
1941] NOTES 1099
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
AVAILABILITY OF CHAPTER XI OF THE CHANDLER, ACT
FOR AVOIDING LIABILITY UNDER A STATE STATUTE*
CHAPTER XI of the Chandler Act' provides embarrassed debtors with an
expeditious method for obtaining judicial sanction of their settlements with
unsecured creditors. Although designed principally as a quick, practical,
and economical means for rehabilitating small enterprises,2 the wide juris-
dictional scope of the chapter and its extreme flexibility of procedure have
tempted reorganizers to abuse its purpose in seeking protection against more
stringent methods of financial readjustment.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has recently considered the avail-
ability of a Chapter XI proceeding as a means of avoiding a debtor's liability
under a state statute for fraudulent practices in the sale of securities to the
public.3 The debtor was the president, majority stockholder, and active
manager of Reinforced Paper Bottle Corporation, which in turn owned 100
per cent of the stock of Safety Service Milk Bottle Corporation. The At-
torney-General of New York, charging fraudulent misrepresentations in the
sale of stock owned personally by the debtor and issued by Reinforced,
brought an action in the state supreme court under the New York Martin
Act 4 against the debtor and the two corporations which she controlled.
The Martin Act, passed for the purpose of avoiding a multiplicity of suits
and providing defrauded security holders with an efficient remedy against
their vendors, authorized the state court at any stage of the proceedings
to appoint a receiver of "all property . . . derived by means of" the fraudu-
lent practices prohibited by the Act.5 After a finding that the debtor and
Reinforced had engaged in fraudulent misrepresentations in the sale of the
debtor's stock, the court entered a judgment appointing a receiver and author-
izing him to liquidate the fraudulently derived property for the benefit of
intervening claimants establishing an interest in it.0
*In re Koch, 116 F. (2d) 243 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
1. Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 840, 11 U.S. C., §§ 1-1103 (Supp. 1938). Further
citations to the bankruptcy Act will refer only to the section number. Sections of
Chapter XI are numbered from 301-399.
2. See Rostow and Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganization:
Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1334.
3. In re Koch, 116 F. (2d) 243 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
4. N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-359.
5. Section 353a of the Martin Act reads in part: "... the court at any stage
of the proceedings may appoint a receiver of any and all property derived by the
• . . defendants . . . by means of any such fraudulent practices, including also all
property with which such property has been mingled if such property can not be identi-
fied in kind because of such commingling . . . The judgment . . . may provide that
such receiver shall take title to any or all such property . . . for the benefit of all
persons intervening in the said action and establishing an interest in such property
." The section further provides for the return to defendants of property in which
no intervenor has established an interest.
6. The judgment itself failed to describe specifically the fraudulently derived
property. The court's findings of fact, however, somewhat ambiguously stated that
the proceeds from the fraudulent sales totalled approximately $1,000,000; that the debtor
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At the alleged instigation of a Stockholders Protective Committee organized
for the purpose of preventing liquidation of corporate assets,- the debtor and
Reinforced strategically filed original petitions in separate federal courts
under Chapter XI on respective pleas of insolvency. The debtor's proposed
"arrangement" filed with her petition and submitted to the District Court
for the Southern District of New York was made expressly conditional on
the confirmation of the arrangement proposed by Reinforced in the federal
court in Delaware. Both plans contemplated a readjustment of the corpora-
tion's obligations to the debtor arising principally from a series of loans
extended by her at various intervals during the corporation's history. As a
major creditor of Reinforced,8 the debtor proposed in her own arrangement
to file a consent in the Delaware court to the terms of the corporate arrange-
ment providing for the cancellation 0 or subordination 10 of a substantial amount
of her claims. She further proposed to deliver the certificates of indebtedness
issued to her as a discharge of the corporation's remaining obligations to
all of her own unsecured creditors "for the full amount of all claims."'"
All of the 31 creditors listed in the debtor's schedule filed consents to her
plan.'
2
The state court receiver, after notice, appeared before the bankruptcy
referee to challenge the jurisdiction of the court over property derived by
the debtor from the proceeds of the fraudulent transactions and to contest
the referee's proposed orders confirming the arrangement and restraining
the receiver from interfering with the debtor's possession. After a hearing,
the referee issued a final order of confirmation which included an injunction
against any action by the receiver to enforce the state court judgment.'
made loans to both corporations; that the approximate amount loaned "to the said
corporatiof' was $650,000; that both corporations had issued promissory notes to her
of about $1,200,000; and that all the assets of both corporations had been derived from
the fraudulent practices. Record on Appeal, pp. 97-116.
7. In petitioning for an arrangement under Chapter X1, the debtor alleged with-
out being controverted that the Stockholders Protective Committee had the "support"
of several hundred stockholders who paid in excess of 800,000 for their stuck out of
a total of $1,000,000 worth sold by the debtor.
8. The face amount of the debtor's claims against the corporation, including loans,
unpaid salary, and monies expended on behalf of the corporation totalled approximately
$900,000.
9. The debtor proposed to cancel promissory notes of the total face value of about
$350,000 issued to her by the corporation, and also approximately $30,000 on an olpen
account.
10. To effect the subordination of promissory notes with a face value of about
$318,000, the debtor planned to deliver the notes in escrow to the corporation's directors
for deposit with them until such time as the corporation's net earnings were sufficient
for dividends on the two prior classes of stock.
11. The proposed certificates of indebtedness to be issued to the debtor under the
corporate arrangement amounted to approximately $190,000 in face value whereas the
debtor's unsecured creditors held claims totalling only abuut $17,000.
12. None of the claims of the defrauded stockholders, however, vas listed in the
debtor's schedule.
13. The terms of the injunction against the state court receiver restrained him or
his agents from "instituting or prosecuting any proceeding or action at law or in equity
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From an order of the federal court overruling his petition for review, the
receiver filed notice of appeal. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, after two hearings, affirmed the decision of the lower court.
14
Notwithstanding the general desirability of preserving the state's power
to administer local laws free from federal interference,'6 the National Bank-
ruptcy Act in special cases authorizes bankruptcy courts to take over juris-
diction from courts operating under state law.", Thus, Section 2(a)(21)
of the Act empowers the bankruptcy court "to require receivers or trustees
appointed in proceedings not under this Act, assignees for the benefit of
creditors, and agents authorized to take possession of or to liquidate a
person's property" to deliver the property in their possession to the debtor,
provided the assignee, agent, trustee or receiver was appointed within four
against the debtor in any court for the purpose of taking possession of or interfering
with any property, assets and effects owned by the debtor, or for the purpose of exerting
any claim against her." Record on Appeal, p.9. Presumably, without violating the
injunction, stockholders might have asserted individual fraud claims against the debtor,
the injunction having only the effect of exempting her from the operation of the statu-
tory remedy provided by the Martin Act.
14. After the first hearing, the court denied the receiver's claim of "title" as vested
by the terms of the state judgment and affirmed the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over
the debtor's fraudulently derived property on the theory that title could not pass with-
out a specific identification of the property by the state court. On rehearing, however,
the court assumed that the findings construed with the judgment sufficiently identified
the property but that, since no stockholder had intervened in the state proceedings, the
debtor was the "only cestui of the receiver's trust." In re Koch, 116 F. (2d) 243 (C. C. A.
2d, 1940). The trust theory thus adopted by the court appears, however, to regard
the receiver as a mere adverse claimant without a substantial title. It seems a grossly
inadequate doctrinal device for solving the larger problem of jurisdictional conflicts
between state and federal courts. Clearly inconsistent with the state statute, the holding
in effect makes state jurisdiction over the property dependent on the intervention of
claimants in the state proceedings.
15. A possible theory for sustaining bankruptcy jurisdiction in the instant case
may be found in the rule applicable in ordinary in rem actions making jurisdiction
dependent on priority of possession. See Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36 (1928).
Where the courts in conflict have "concurrent" jurisdiction the concept of "constructive
possession" has been successfully used to avoid the requirement of actual seizure by a
court officer, thus effecting a policy of comity. See Penn General Casualty Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 189 (1935). The same concept, more strictly applied, is avail-
able even where the two suits are not "substantially for the same purpose." See, as a
leading case, Adams v. Mercantile Trust Co., 66 Fed. 617 (C. C. A. 5th, 1895). But
where the federal court is a court of exclusive jurisdiction, as in bankruptcy or admiralty,
the stated rule requires actual seizure. See Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256 (1894).
Thus, since the state court receiver in the instant case had no actual possession, it is
arguable that the bankruptcy court obtained a prior jurisdiction. See Shirley, Conflicling
Jurisdictioi- in the Appointmnent of Receivers (1938) 16 TEx. L. REV. 471.
16. The bankruptcy court in a Chapter XI proceeding, for example, may not only
stay pending actions hi personan, perhaps ultimately discharging the claim, but it may
also enjoin until final decree any action against the debtor including suits to enforce
liens. See § 314.
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months of the bankruptcy proceeding. 17 The power to issue a turnover
order under the provision obviously implies a power to enjoin an inter-
ference with the debtor's possession that would subsequently require a
turnover order.18 If the Martin Act receiver is one of the class of "receivers"
coming within the provision, it would seem immaterial that the state court
judgment vested him with "title" to the debtor's property since assignees
for the benefit of creditors, expressly included in the section, have a similar
type of legal title.19 It is arguable, however, that the provision was designed
to cover only general receiverships. The authority of a receiver appointed
under the Martin Act is limited to taking possession only of property derived
from fraudulent practices prohibited by the Act; and his appointment has
been held not to constitute an act of bankruptcy.2 0 Although limited receivers
may be included within the scope of Section 2(a) (21) without violence to
the rule restricting acts of bankruptcy to general receiverships, 21 the legis-
lative history of the provision indicates an intent merely to codify pre-
existing case law permitting the bankruptcy court to require surrenders of
possession by general equity receivers.
22
A less doubtful basis for the superseding jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court in the instant case is provided by Section 67(a) of the Act invalidating
all liens against the debtor's property obtained by "attachment, judgment,
levy, or other legal or equitable process or proceedings" within four months
of the petition under Chapter XI and at a time when the debtor was insolvent.
The Martin Act proceeding satisfied all the time requirements of the
Section. The validity of claims to property by state court receivers appointed
more than four months before the filing of a petition has been sustained on
17. That the provision applies to Chapter XI proceedings as well as ordinary bank-
ruptcy is necessarily implied by the terms exempting Chapters X and XII from the
four months limitation. See § 2(a) (21).
18. See In re Glenroe Corp., 1 F. Supp. 664 (S. D. N. Y. 1932) ; Carling v. Seymour
Lumber Co., 113 Fed. 483 (C. C.A. 5th, 1902), cert. denied, 186 U. S. 484 (1902).
19. See Shor v. McGregor, 108 F. (2d) 421 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) ; see also 1 Co aEn
ox BAxxRuprcy (14th ed. 1940) 312.
20. Elfast v. Lamb, 111 F. (2d) 434 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). Similarly the Supreme
Court, in Duparquet Huot & Monu use Co. v,. Evanr, interpreted the appointment uf a
receiver in a foreclosure proceeding as an insufficient basis for a reorganization petition
under old § 77B(i). 297 U. S. 216 (1936). The provision might be held applicable
in the Delaware proceeding on the grounds that the judgment authorized the receiver
to take possession of all the corporate assets. See (1936) 36 CoL L. RE%. 150; (1936)
84 U. OF P. L. R~v. 782-4; (1936) 3 U. OF Cui. L. REv. 325-7. See also Standard
Acc. Ins. Co. v. Sheftall, 53 F. (2d) 40 (C. C.A. 5th, 1931).
21. Perhaps the strongest argument for including limited receivers within the
provision may be found in one of the various theories formerly used to sustain turnover
orders issued to receivers appointed in suits on creditors' bills: namely, that bank-
ruptcy nullified the appointment as a judgment, levy, or lien within the purview of
old § 67. Blair v. Brailey, 221 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1915), cert. denied, 238 U. S. 634
(1915); First Nat. Bank v. Guarantee Title & Trust Co., 178 Fed. 187 (C. C. A. 3d,
1910) ; Mauran v. Crown Carpet Lining Co., 23 RL I. 324, 50 A. 331 (1901).
22. H. R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 20. See also, 1 COLLn
oN BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) 299-300.
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the theory that their appointment operates as an "equitable attachment." 2
A similar argument seems to be available to establish the invalidity of a
receiver's lien acquired within four months of a petition.24 Notwithstanding
the doctrine that local law determines the effect of state court judgments,
25
the use of the word "lien" is obviously not essential to create the consequent
legal relations implied by the term. The qualified title of a receiver asserted
for the benefit of unidentified claimants appears to fall clearly within the
scope of the provision, especially since its general purpose is to avoid prefer-
ences created by legal proceedings. The theory that the bankruptcy court
acquired jurisdiction of property claimed by the receiver under a void lien
is simplified by a new provision of the Act overruling earlier case law2 0
and subjecting adverse claimants under Section 67(a) to the summary
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.27 Since, moreover, in the instant case
the federal court in Delaware might for similar reasons assume control of
the corporation's assets, the possibility of invoking federal jurisdiction con-
ceivably provided the defrauded stockholders with an opportunity of sacri-
ficing their insubstantial shares in the liquidation of corporate assets for a
more profitable rehabilitation of their interests in a going concern. The
purported purpose of the Chapter XI proceeding, supported by the Stock-
holders Protective Committee, was to avoid, for the benefit of stockholders,
a liquidation of the corporation under the Martin Act.
28
But a recognition of the bankruptcy court's statutory jurisdiction over
the debtor's assets, including those claimed by the receiver, does not, of
course, determine the principal issues of the propriety of the order confirming
the arrangement or the validity of the injunction against enforcement of the
state court judgment.29 A free exercise of discretion by the court in con-
firming arrangements seems generally desirable in light of the absence of
specific statutory criteria for determining the fairness of the plan and the
23. In re Leverich, 38 F. (2d) 72 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) ; Clements v. Conyers, 32 F.
(2d) 5 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929); Neely v. McGehee, 2 F. (2d) 853 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924);
Blair v. Brailey, 221 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1915), cert. denied, 238 U. S. 634 (1915)
It re Bartlett Oil & Gas Corp., 44 F. (2d) 616 (N. D. Okla., 1930).
24. Liens within the scope of § 67(a) are void irrespective of whether the obliga-
tions on which they were obtained are provable or dischargeable. Wagner v. Mt. Carmel
Iron Works, 270 Fed. 80 (C. C. A. 3d, 1921) ; In re Green, 179 Fed. 870 (W. D. Pa.,
1910).
25. See Ingels v. Boteler, 100 F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), af/'d, 308 U. S.
57 (1938).
26. Formerly, receivers asserting a lien and denying the existence of facts sufficient
for invalidation under § 67 were held adverse claimants and could be reached only in
plenary proceedings. See Miller v. Potts, 26 F. (2d) 851 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928); Martin
v. Oliver, 260 Fed. 89 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919); In re Dayton Coal & Iron Co., 291 Fed.
390 (E. D. Tenn., 1922).
27. See §67(a) (4).
28. Several hundred of the defrauded stockholders filed affidavits in the state court
proceedings pledging their loyalty to the debtor and urging that the corporation's affairs
be left in her charge.
29. See note 13 supra.
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lack of procedural machinery for investigating its financial feasibility."' The
power of the bankruptcy court, as a court of equity, to surrender its juris-
diction in special cases may serve as an effective means of closely circum-
scribing the availability of a Chapter XI proceeding as an escape from the
operation of state law.3' The Supreme Court recently filled an obvious need
in the Chandler Act by requiring the court in a Chapter XI proceeding to
relinquish jurisdiction where more appropriate relief might be obtained under
Chapter X.32 An analogous policy might appropriately be adopted to protect
the administration of local law from unwarranted interference by the federal
courts.as In Penusylvania v. Williams 34 the Supreme Court recognized the
authority of federal courts in equity receivership reorganizations to abandon
their jurisdiction in favor of state proceedings where adequate relief might
be obtained under local statutes. Although the relief provided by the Bank-
ruptcy Act is, in theory, exclusively within federal jurisdiction, Chapter XI
requires that the court, before confirming an arrangement, must be satisfied
that it is "fair, equitable, and feasible," "for the best interest of creditors,"
and is proposed "in good faith."3 5 The broad interpretation of which the
concepts are susceptible offers a convenient statutory basis for the exercise
of sound discretion by the court in refusing to interfere with state proceed-
ings. Since, however, the Chapter is designed for speed and economy, rather
than the thorough reorganization provided by Chapter X, the court's power
to relinquish its jurisdiction will probably be exercised sparingly unless a
valid reason for doing otherwise appears on the face of the proceeding.
Resort to the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court to abandon its
jurisdiction, however, is apparently unnecessary to establish the invalidity
of the injunction in the instant case. Mlthough unliquidated tort claims are
generally not provable in bankruptcy proceedings,30 for the purposes of an
arrangement under Chapter XI providing for an extension of time for the
payment of debts in full, debtors may include in their plan "all unsecured
30. Compare the detailed procedure under Chapter ). See note 2 supra.
31. The possibility of repairing the defects of a somewhat poorly drafted statute
through the use of the equity powers of the bankruptcy court is suggested by the opinion
of Mr. Justice Stone in Securities & Exch. Comm. v. U. S. Realty & Imp. Co., 310 U. S.
434 (1940).
32. Securities and Exch. Comm. v. U. S. Realty & Imp. Co., 310 U. S. 434 (1940).
See (1940) 49 YAr L. J. 927; (1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. RE,. 873.
33. In In re Lipnwn, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the bankruptcy
court should in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction dismiss a petition for a composition
under old § 74 which sought principally to avoid a tort judgment rendered by the state
court. 78 F. (2d) 872 (C. C.A. 7th, 1935).
34. 294 U. S. 176 (1935).
35. § 366. Where, however, as in the instant case, all the creditors who are affected
by the arrangement consent to a confirmation it appears that the court must be satisfied
only that the arrangement and its acceptance are in good faith and have not been made
or procured by any means forbidden by the Act. See § 361.
36. See Ganzan, Status of Tort Clains under the Reorganization Act (1935) 2 Co.p.
REoR . 192. Claims in pending negligence actions are, however, provable under
§ 63(a) (7).
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debts, demands, or claims of whatever character . . . whether or not prov-
able . . . and whether liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent." 
' T
Had the debtor in the present case proposed a "scaling down" as well as
an extension of the defrauded stockholders' claims, they might nevertheless
have possibly been provable under theories of unjust enrichment.3 8 Since,
however, under Sections 356 and 367, an arrangement may be confined to
the alteration of the rights of a single class of creditors and bind claimants
not affected by its terms, the validity of the debtor's plan was apparently
not impaired by her failure to schedule the stockholders as creditors. But
it does not follow that creditors not participating in the arrangement may
be permanently precluded from enforcing their claims. Under Section 371
of the Act only debts "provided for by the arrangement" are discharged by
the order of confirmation. Admittedly in the instant case the debtor pro-
posed no readjustment of her liabilities to the defrauded stockholders except
as the confirmation order submitted to the referee included an injunction
against further action by the state court receiver.8 9 Even had the plan by
its terms attempted to alter the rights of unscheduled creditors, Section 17
of the Act, incorporated into Chapter XI by Section 371, expressly exempts
from discharge those claimants without notice or actual knowledge of the
proceedings in sufficient time to prove their claims. By the same Section of
the Act, liabilities "for obtaining money or property by false representations"
are not discharged by a confirmation, even though scheduled and included
in the plan of arrangement.40 On the basis of the state court's elaborate
findings, 41 the requirement of elements of fraud imputed into the terms of
the Section may fairly be regarded as satisfied.42 Since then, the confirma-
tion order was powerless, under several provisions of the Act, to discharge
the stockholders' claims against the debtor, a permanent injunction against
the state proceedings would appear beyond the authority of the bankruptcy
court.
Notwithstanding the conclusion that the Act failed to provide for a dis-
charge, an argument for sustaining the injunction might be found in the
equitable powers of the court to protect the execution of the proposed ar-
rangement from interference.43 A material "amount of the debtor's property
37. § 307.
38. See Underhay, Tort Clains in Receiverships and Reorganizations (1936) 22
IOWA L. Rav. 60.
39. Although the terms of the arrangement provided for the payment of "all
creditors" with the certificates to be issued by the corporation, it appears conclusive
that no extension or composition of the stockholders' claims was intended since the
stockholders were not scheduled as creditors and since their claims were not specifically
meptioned in the plan. See Record on Appeal, pp. 21-29.
40, In re Frischknecht, 223 Fed. 417 (C. C.A. 2d, 1915).
41. The findings of the state court included 49 specific types of false "pretenses,
representations and promises" made by the debtor and Reinforced. See Record on
Appeal, pp. 106-112.
42. See Forsyth v. Vehmeyer, 177 U. S. 177 (1900).
43. Upon consummation of an arrangement the court may enter a decree "making
such provisions, by the way of injunction or otherwise, as may be equitable." See § 372.
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identified by the state court as derived from the proceeds of the fraudulent
transactions, and thus claimed by the receiver, consisted of promissory notes
which were issued by Reinforced and apparently proposed for cancellation
by the two arrangement schemes. The injunction order, however, was not
restricted to action by the receiver hindering the consummation of the federal
proceedings. Directed toward preventing the enforcement of the state court
judgment, it substantially deprived stockholders of an expedient remedy
provided by state law without a concomitant discharge of their claims. How-
ever genuinely stockholder interests were represented by the Protective
Committee protesting the liquidation of corporate assets, the assumption of
federal power to stalemate the judgment of the state court appears to ditrt
the purpose of a Chapter XI proceeding, conceived to provide debtors with
a method of effecting a composition or extension of their creditors' claims.
Since, without a general authority in the bankruptcy court to extinguish
the debtor's obligations to stockholders, the actuating purpose of the plan
was frustrated, the court might have declined to confirm the proposed ar-
rangement in order to prevent an abuse of its jurisdiction.4 4 Nevertheless
a consummation of the proceedings, including a cancellation of the corporate
obligations, operated only as a formal barrier to the enforcement of the state
judgment; as found by the state court, in addition to the proceeds of the
fraudulent transactions retained by the debtor, all the assets of the corpora-
tion and its subsidiary had been fraudulently derived.4 5 The superseding
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, under settled theory, nullified the re-
ceiver's lien without voiding the judgment of the state court43 Thus, in
the absence of the injunction, the lien presumably might be reinstated and
the state proceedings continued. Whichever alternative doctrine is adopted,
a reversal of the present holding seems desirable to preclude escapes from
state law under the authority of an inappropriate federal statute
4 7
44. See In re Lipman, 78 F. (2d) 872 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
45. See Record on Appeal, p. 114.
46. See In re Wesley Corp., 18 F. Supp. 347 (E. D. Ky. 1937); Pope v. Title
Guaranty & Surety Co., 152 Wis. 611, 140 N. IV. 348 (1913).
47. In the proceedings for a corporate arrangement in the federal court in Delaware
the SEC has filed motions for leave to intervene and for a dismissal of the petition. The
Commission alleges that approximately 800 persons hold 116,3S0 shares of stock in
Reinforced and that Chapter X is more appropriate for an adjustment of the corporation's
obligations, particularly in view of the receivership proceedings pending in the state
court. The district court has referred the motions to a referee for hearing. Since the
debtor's arrangement in the instant case is contingent on the confirmation of the cor-
porate arrangement, a Chapter X proceeding, as an alternative for a reversal of the
decision of the Second Circuit Court, would probably insure a protection of the stock-
holders' interests.
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VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS WHICH VIOLATE
REGULATORY STATUTES*
AMONG the contracts which will not usually be enforced in court, either
by way of specific performance or by award of damages for breach, are those
contemplating action in violation of a statute.1 Even where such nullity is
not specifically directed by the legislature, public policy is generally thought
to require it, either to punish lawbreakers by withholding societal assistance
from an illegal transaction, or to maintain the integrity of the judicial pro-
cess.2 At common law the doctrine was stated and applied inflexibly; provid-
ing both parties to the contract were equally aware of the illegality, it made
no difference how the equities balanced between them, or whether the con-
tract had been wholly performed on one side. The courts simply refused
to act, leaving the parties where they stood.3
The administration of this rule conflicted with the more basic policy of
preserving the inviolability of contracts, and frequently, too, seemed to offend
equity, especially in cases where the illegality was remote, the stake large,
and the defense an unconscionable technicality. To meet such situations, the
courts developed various loopholes: illegality which was merely "collateral"
would not void the whole contract ;4 the enumeration of other penalties im-
plied a legislative intention not to void contracts ;r penalties in revenue stat-
utes were not intended to make taxable activity unlawful, but were designed
merely to enforce payment;G contracts involving inahn in sc were wholly
void, while those involving merely malut prohibitum were not.7  Of all
these slippery distinctions, that based on legislative "intention" seems the
most reasonable; sometimes it is entirely clear whether the statute affects vio-
lating contracts. But even this criterion is no better than a blind guess by
* A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 61 Sup. Ct. 414 (U. S. 1941).
1. The cases are collected in 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1938) § 1628 el
seq.; 12 AM. JuR. (1938) § 158 et seq.; 2 BLACK, REciSSION AND CANCELLATION (2d ed.
1929) § 318. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 580; GREENnOOD, TnE DOCTRINE
OF PUBLIC POLICY (1886) 529, Rule CCCCLI.
2. See Bank of United States v. Owens, 2 Pet. 527, 538 (U. S. 1829).
3. The rule is frequently expressed in the maxims: ex dolo malo non orilur acaio,
and in pari delicto potior est conditio defendenlis et possidentis. For particularly harsh
applications, see National Industrial Fire Ins. Co. v. Great So. Fire Ins. Co., 177 Ky.
56, 197 S. W. 530 (1917); Overby v. Overby, 21 La. 493 (1869); Rosasco Cream-
cries v. Cohen, 249 App. Div, 228, 292 N. Y. Supp. 9 (1st Dep't 1936); De Groot v.
Van Duzer, 20 Wend. 390 (N. Y. 1838); Coules v. Pharris, 212 Wis. 558, 250 N. W.
404 (1933).
4. Armstrong v. American Exch. Nat. Bank, 133 U. S. 433 (1890) ; RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS (1932) § 597.
5. Union Nat. Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621 (1878); Union Gold Min. Co. v.
Rocky Mt. Nat. Bank, 96 U. S. 640 (1877) ; Lamed v. Andrews, 106 Mass. 435 (1871).
6. Simmons v. Oatman, 110 Kan. 44, 202 Pac. 977 (1921); Goldsmith v. Manu-
facturer's Liability Ins. Co., 132 Md. 283, 103 At. 627 (1918).
7. Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143 (1883). When dealing with matters prohibited
by statute it seems irrelevant on the issue of contractual validity whether the matter
contravenes good morals or not.
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the court in those many instances where the legislature has not considered the
relation of a new penal statute to contract liability.
In the first such case arising under one of the New Deal regulatory stat-
utes, the Supreme Court followed the policy recommendation of the commis-
sion which administered the statute, and indulged a presumption that con-
tracts in violation of the law were enforceable unless it were proved that
public policy or proper administration of the statute required otherwise.8
Defendant corporation had given the plaintiff an option to purchase its
1,300,000 shares of treasury stock, which plaintiff was to sell in interstate
commerce, although the shares had not been registered, as required, under
the Securities Act of 1933.9 The option contract also permitted defendant
to make direct sales to investors and to credit plaintiff with the proceeds in
excess of the option price. After several such sales, defendant refused to
honor the exercise of plaintiff's option either by paying over the excess pro-
ceeds or by delivering the unsold shares. The trial court gave judgment for
the plaintiff to the extent that the contract had been executed and credits be-
tween defendant and plaintiff created, but declared the option unenforce-
able and void as to the undelivered shares. The Idaho Supreme Court de-
clared the whole contract void ab initio for violation of the Securities Act
and denied any recovery whatsoever.10 It is not entirely clear from the
Supreme Court opinion whether, in reversing the Idaho appellate court, it
approved the trial court's verdict, but the language of the opinion is broad
enough to sustain a judgment for the plaintiff both for the executed and
executory parts of his contract.1
2
The Securities Act, unlike most of the other acts administered by the SEC,
contains no express provisions invalidating contracts made in violation of
it.13 Section 5, however, makes it "unlawful for any person, directly or in-
directly," to sell or advertise securities in interstate commerce unless a regis-
tration statement is in effect. Section 24 imposes severe criminal penalties
for violations, and Section 12 imposes direct civil liability in favor of invest-
8. A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 61 Sup. Ct. 414 (U. S. 1941).
Usually a contrary presumption is indulged, and contracts violating statutes are enforced,
if at all, only by way of exception to the rule. Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U. S. 129 (1922);
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540 (1902).
9. 48 STAT. 74, 15 U. S. C. §77a et seq. (1934).
10. 61 Idaho 21, 98 P. (2d) 965 (1939).
11. Although the enforceability of contracts is normally a matter of state law, this
case is so completely dependent upon a federal statute that probably no independent non-
federal ground exists. Dietrich v. Greaney, 309 U. S. 190 (1939); Awotin v. Atlas
Exch. Bank, 295 U. S. 209 (1935) ; cf. Danciger v. Cooley, 248 U. S. 319, 328 (1919);
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Grand Nat. Bank, 69 F. (2d) 177 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
12. The Court noted the distinction which the trial court had made but did not dis-
cuss it. The judgment of the appellate court was reversed without any qualifications.
And the opinion stated broadly: ". . . generally, at least, what the parties have agreed
to ought not to be struck down." 61 Sup. Ct. 414, 418 (U. S. 1941).
13. Cf. Securities and Exchange Act, 48 STAT. 903, 15 U. S. C. §78cc(b) (1934);
Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 STAT. 835, 15 U. S. C. § 79z(b) (Supp. 1939) ;
Investment Company Act, Pub. L. No. 768, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (Aug. 22, 1940), Title
I, § 47(b) ; Investment Advisers' Act, id. Title II, § 215(b).
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ors on those who sell in violation of Section 5.14 The Supreme Court viewed
the defense to this action as a request for judicial enlargement of these statu-
tory penalties. And to such a request the Court declared itself unsympathetic
unless the defendant could show affirmatively that the addition of this sanc-
tion would "further the essential purpose of the enactment." 1r
In a brief arnici curiae submitted by the SEC, it was argued that the nor-
mal underwriting procedure was the reverse of that in the instant case, in
that the underwriter usually collects the proceeds of public sale and holds
them, less commission, to the credit of the corporation. Even if securities
were unregistered in this more usual situation, the SEC and the Supreme
Court thought that it would be to the investors' best interest that the cor-
poration be assisted to recover on the unlawful contract and to put the in-
vestors' money to its intended use in the business. By this hypothetical exam-
ple the court was persuaded against a blanket rule of unenforceability.
While the result of the case could be justified from precedent, and is de-
sirable from broad considerations of public policy and equity between the
parties, the reasoning of the opinion, and of the SEC brief on which it was
founded, seems unconvincing. In support of its presumption against the
exercise of "public policy" to void contracts, the Court cites Steele v. Drum-
mond 17 and Twin Cities Co. v. Harding Glass Co.,18 both of which are
concerned with the problem of whether there is any "public policy" in their
situations-and not, as is the instant case, with the question of whether an
admitted public policy against the contract should be ignored.
On the practical level of the SEC brief, the hypothetical example of an
underwriter "holding out" on a corporation seems unrealistic. Most under-
writing today is a direct sale, and the underwriter's liability to the issuer is
perfected on the contractual closing day regardless of the amount of pub-
lic resales.19 Since the whole question is likely to arise only in cases of little-
known, speculative issues, the interest of investors would seem adequately
protected by the existing machinery for their individual recission and recov-
ery from the underwriter rather than by lending judicial aid to the consum-
mation of an unlawful transaction.20 And, finally, the SEC brief and the
14. It was argued that this transaction did not violate § 5 on the ground that it was
a "transaction by an issuer not involving a public offering," exempt under § 4(1). The
Idaho court and the SEC thought the exemption inapplicable here because of the clear
intention to resell publicly. The Supreme Court did not rule on the issue.
15. 61 Sup. Ct. 414, 417 (U. S. 1941).
16. The SEC brief argued wholly in terms of practical results, considering as im-
material any reference to "voidness" or "illegality." In similar situations, with similar
ends in view, some courts have thought it necessary to call a contract void in order to
give a deserving plaintiff the remedy of recission. See, e.g., Kneeland v. Emerton, 280
Mass. 371, 183 N. E. 155 (1932).
17. 275 U. S. 199 (1927) (contract to procure necessary ordinances and franchises
for a projected railroad).
18. 283 U. S. 353 (1931) (contract attacked on grounds of threatened common law
restraint of trade).
19. See DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY or CORPORATIONS (3d rev. ed. 1934) 990-91,
n1. i; MOULTON, CAPITAL EXPANSION AND STABILITY (1940) 210, 211.
20. In the case posed by the SEC brief, investors who had purchased securities from
the defaulting underwriter could, without other proof than the breach of registration,
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Supreme Court opinion entirely ignore the in terrorent value of a judicial
refusal to enforce these unlawful contracts.
2 1
The recent multiplication of statutes which, like the Securities Act, pro-
hibit certain things and penalize their performance makes a restatement of
legal principles on this question highly desirable.2 2 It does not seem possible
to synthesize the doctrines in all of the many hundreds of cases collected in
reference works under the head of "void" or "illegal" contracts.a Even
the use of labels to describe the conclusions reached is not consistent. Gen-
erally an "illegal" contract is one so thoroughly unlawful that the courts %ill
not help in any way to enforce or rescind it.2 4 But some courts have declared
contracts in violation of penal statutes to be "illegal" and "not void" at the
same time-which has the effect of allowing one party to rescind the executory
parts of his bargain and recover back any money already paid, though nut
to sue for specific performance.2-5 The term "void" is also used in different
senses-sometimes in the strict sense of illegal,2 0 and sometimes to describe
an unlawful contract which cannot be specifically enforced, but which, if
partly executed, will be judicially unravelled to put the parties in state quo
ante.
27
Out of the formidable mass of precedent from every American jurisdic-
tion, two distinct judicial attitudes are discernible. New York generally fol-
lows the harshly automatic rule of the old American and the English cases
that every contract involving a statutory violation is wholly unenforceable
and void.28 It is apparent that this rule is one degree stricter than would be
necessary to bring about a contrary result in the instant case. The Securities
Act contains both a prohibition and a penalty, but under this rule the presence
of a penalty alone is sufficient to void a contract.
rescind their bargain, or, in the alternative, recover damages where they had resold the
securities. Securities Act, § 12(1).
21. See Shulman, Civil Liabilities and the Securities Adt (1933) 43 Y.ALE L J. 227,
253; Comment (1940) 50 YALE L. J. 90.
22. See Baker, Legislative Crimes (1939) 23 MiNN. L. Rav. 135; Jones, Excessive
Law Making (1940) 16 TEsN. L. Rv. 456. The latter estimates the annual productiun
of new laws in this country as between 5,000 and 10,000.
23. See note 1 supra.
24. Sage v. Hampe, 235 U. S. 99 (1914); St. Louis, V. & T. H. R. R. v. Terre
Haute & I. R. R., 145 U. S. 393 (1892) ; Holland v. Sheehan, 108 Minn. 362, 12! X. W.
1 (1909).
25. Vercellini v. United States Ind. Realty Co., 158 Minn. 72, 196 N. W. 672 (1924).
26. Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242, 61 At. 604 (1905); Kellog v. Howes, 81 Cal.
170, 22 Pac. 509 (1889).
27. Kneeland v. Emerton, 280 Mass. 371, 183 N. E. 155 (1932); ef. Roller v. Mur-
ray, 112 Va. 780, 72 S. E. 665 (1911).
28. Lord Holt's rule is well known: "Every contract made for or about any matter
or thing which is prohibited and made unlawful by any statute is a void contract, though
the statute itself doth not mention that it shall be so, but only inflicts a penalty on the
offender, because a penalty implies a prohibition, though there are no prohibitory words
in the statute." Bartlett v. Vinor, Carth. 251, 252, 90 Eng. Rep. 750 (K. B. 1692). The
rule is quoted with approval in Sturm v. Truby, 245 App. Div. 357, 282 N. Y. Supp. 433
(4th Dep't 1935). Cf. Rosasco Creameries v. Cohen, 249 App. Div. 228, 292 N. Y. Supp.
1 (1st Dep't 1936) ; De Groot v. Van Duzer, 20 Wend. 390 (N. Y. 1838).
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A more liberal view has prevailed from time to time in the Supreme Court,
in Massachusetts, and in some of the western states. In 1851 the Supreme
Court, enforcing payment of a note given in consideration of an illegal slave
sale, pointed out that diversity of legislation required a diversity of rule, and
suggested that a logical distinction existed between the unlawfulness of for-
bidden acts and the unenforceability of private contracts involving those
acts.29 In 1878, upholding a contract in which a National Bank took illegal
security for a loan, the Court declared its independence of the letter of the
statute, and made a careful investigation of legislative intent, with particular
reference to the effect upon the statutory scheme of a blanket refusal to
enforce illegal contracts.30 The leading Massachusetts case of Bowditch v.
New England Mutuwl Insurance Co. 31 liberalized the general rule by distin-
guishing statutes directory from statutes prohibitory-a distinction spurious
in logic, but useful as a tool of equity. At least five or six states followed
with clear holdings that where a prohibited act is not per se immoral or
criminal, and the statute forbidding it is merely a business regulation, con-
tracts for its performance are not wholly void unless expressly declared so
by the legislature. 2 This would seem the most desirable general rule, ex-
cept, of course, in those cases where one party to the contract belonged to the
class of direct and intended beneficiaries of the regulation, and where the
rule must vary as he is either plaintiff or defendant.33 Similarly there seems
no objection to the application of the strict rule of unenforceability where
the transaction is not only in technical violation of the regulation but is in-
trinsically fraudulent. Since the contract in the instant case was not per se
fraudulent, and did not involve, as a contracting party, an "investor," the
decision is in accord with these views.
The cases arising under the various state Blue Sky laws present no con-
sistent pattern. In the first place the statutes vary considerably. Twenty-three
states provide that contracts of sale in violation of the act shall be "voidable"
at the option of the purchaser ;34 four use the word "void" ;35 and fifteen
merely provide penalties for violations without specifying the effect upon
contracts. 36 Only from the last group of states can direct analogies to the
29. Harris v. Runnels, 12 How. 79 (U. S. 1851).
30. Union Nat. Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621 (1878).
31. 141 Mass. 292, 294, 4 N. E. 798, 801 (1886).
32. Doherty v. McAuliffe, 74 F. (2d) 800 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935), cert. dentied, 294
U. S. 730 (1935), and cases there cited. See 2 BLACk, op. cit. supra note 1, at §318.
33. Usually the statutes specifically provide for recission in favor of the statute-
beneficiary and the courts have supplied the obvious corollary that enforcement will not
be granted against him. Mann v. Mann, 176 N. C. 353, 97 S. E. 175 (1918); Leininger
v. Ward-Beekman, 139 Okla. 292, 282 Pac. 467 (1929); Turney v. J. H. Tilliman
Co., 112 Ore. 122, 228 Pac. 933 (1924).
34. Ala., Ark., Colo., Fla., Ga., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., La., Mich., Mo., N. C.,
Ohio, Okla., S. C., Utah, Vt., Va., Wash., W. Va., Wis. See 1 C. C. H. Stocks & Bonds
Law Serv. (Blue Sky Compil.) T f 4720, 4840, 4900 (1937). Massachusetts' unique pro-
vision most closely approximates this group.
35. Calif., N. D., Ore., Tenn. (semnble).
36. Ariz., Conn., Idaho, Maine, Minn., Miss., Mont., N. H., N. M., N. Y., Penn.,
R. I., S. D., Tex., Wyo.
[Vol, 501112
Securities Act be drawn-and here there is a split of authority. A majority
treat violating contracts as unenforceable if still executory and subject to
recission if partly performed.3 7 A minority clings to the old strict rule on
"illegal" contracts and refuses to have anything to do with them.- s Of course
the vast majority of cases in every state under the Blue Sky laws deal with
situations where one party belongs to the very group for whose benefit the
statute was enacted. Against such a plaintiff, "illegality" is never an ade-
quate plea.
While it is frequently said that the courts, in these illegal contracts cases,
look only to the public welfare and not to the interest of individual litigants
who are party to the violation,39 this does not mean that the interest of the
public will always be better served by non-enforcement than by enforcement.
Where, for instance, a private contract runs afoul of statutory prohibition
on some morally indifferent matter (and, more particularly, where the par-
ties have only that constructive knowledge of the prohibition which is im-
plied of all statutes), it seems a greater abuse of justice to deny equitable
enforcement between the parties than to make the court an "instrument for
enforcing an illegal bargain." It is also said that the non-enforceability of
illegal bargains will act as a deterrent to their formation,40 but the contrary
may be true if unscrupulous persons plan to take advantage of technical
statutory violations to avoid their obligations. And in the case of statutes
such as the Securities Act, which *carry heavy criminal penalties, it may
be doubted whether the additional sanction of contractual invalidity would
have any deterrent effect at all.
As yet no cases have arisen under the federal statutes similar to the Securi-
ties Act, most of which provide that "every contract made in violation of
any provision of this title, or of any rule, regulation, or order thereunder,
and every contract . . . the performance of which involves the violation
of . . . this title . . . shall be void." 4' But the attitude of the SEC and
of the Supreme Court in the instant case suggests that when they do, the
word "void" will be interpreted to mean "subject to recission" rather than
"wholly unenforceable." Such an interpretation would mean that, although
executory contracts in violation of the statutes would not be enforced, recov-
ery could be had of money passing under the contract, even where the par-
ties were technically in pari delicto.
In a broader sense, the instant case recognizes, at least by implication,
that this question is as much an issue of the market-place as of the law court.
37. Ashley and Rumelin v. Brady, 41 Idaho 160, 238 Pac. 314 (1925); Karamanou
v. H. V. Greene Co., 80 N. I-. 420, 124 At. 373 (1922). Cf. Edward Y. Ioor, 205 Mich.
617, 172 N. AV. 620 (1919).
38. Reilly v. Clyne, 27 Ariz. 432, 234 Pac. 35 (1925).,
39. Hoffman v. McMullen, 83 Fed. 372 (C. C. A. 9th, 1897) ; 2 B.CK, op. di. supra
note 1, at § 313; cf. Embrey v. Jemison, 131 U. S. 336 (1889). Illegality creates a dis-
ability in the plaintiff rather than a defense for the defendant. See discussion in Rn-
STATEmENT, CoNTRAcTs (1932) § 598.
40. Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U. S. 274 (1927); Reiner v. North Am.
Newspaper Alliance, 259 N. Y. 250, 181 N. E. 744 (1932).
41. See statutory provisions cited at note 13 supra.
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In its deference to the judgment of the administrative body, and its refusal
to be bound by rigid rules of "void" and "illegal" contracts, the Court has
set a valuable example. Mindful of a constantly increasing flood of'regulatory
legislation carrying penal sanctions, courts should feel today not that every
penalty makes private contracts void, but merely that the penalty indicates
the general nature of the public policy.
42
THE SHERMAN ACT AS A CLEAN HANDS DEFENSE*
EVER since the advent of the Sherman Act' illegal restraints of trade by
a plaintiff have been raised as a "clean hands" defense in equitable actions.-
To sustain this defense, a defendant had to prove that the particular restraint
of trade of which the plaintiff was allegedly guilty was directly connected
with the matter in issue, or, to put it conversely, that the claim which the
plaintiff asserted arose out of the allegedly unlawful combination.3 Because
of the difficulty of establishing this proposition, the clean hands defense based
on anti-trust law violations was seldom successful. 4
Recently, however, a specially constituted three judge district court has
seen fit to allow the defense without requiring the usual strict proof of its
applicability.6 The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers0
brought an action to enjoin an allegedly unconstitutional Washington statute 7
designed to regulate the manner in which the Society licenses its copyrighted
music for public performance.3 KMO, Inc., a Washington radio broadcast-
ing station, intervened and moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that
the Society constituted a monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act and
therefore had no standing to sue in a court of equity. The court assumed
42. See Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy (1935) 35 Col.. L. RF~v. 679.
* Buck v. Gallagher, 36 F. Supp. 405 (W. D. Wash. 1940).
1. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-40 (1934).
2. For general treatment of the clean hands maxim, see I POMEROY, A TREAT19F
ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1918) §§ 397-404, MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY (1936) § 24,
3. See note 26, infra.
4. See page 1116 infra, discussing the two situations where the defense ha, been
successful.
5. Buck v. Gallagher, 36 F. Supp. 405 (W. D. Wash. 1940).
6. For a discussion of the recent history of ASCAP, see Cohn, M1sic, Radio
Broadcasters and the Sherman Act (1941) 29 GEORGETOWN L. J. 407.
7. 5 WASH. REv. STAT. §3802 (Remington Supp. 1940). This is one of the eight
anti-ASCAP statutes whicif have been passed to date. See Cohn, supra note 6, at- 416.
Three have been declared unconstitutional. Buck v. Swanson, 33 F. Supp. 377 (D. Neb.
1939); Buck v. Harton, 33 F. Supp. 1014 (M. D. Tenn. 1940); Buck v. Gibbs, 34 F.
Supp. 510 (N. D. Fla. 1940). See Comment (1940) 53 HARV. L. REv. 458.
8. The statute prohibits the Society from operating in Washington if it continues
its present system of blanket licensing but provides that it may operate if it puts its
rates on a per piece basis. The 'statute also requires registration of all copyrighted com-
positions with prices to be charged. See Cohn, supra note 6, at 418.
that every Sherman Act violation justified invocation of the clean hands
doctrine, and found that since the Society's activities unquestionably came
under the interdiction of the Act, the motion to dismiss should be granted.
As authority for the clean hands doctrine the court relied on two Supreme
Court cases decided more than half a century apart.9 Neither involved
restraints of trade; both merely restated the familiar rule that a court of
equity will not enforce claims arising out of fraudulent transactions. Inas-
much as the Society's claim that the Washington statute was unconstitutional
could hardly be considered as arising out of its alleged illegal practices, which
in no sense can be classified as fraudulent, it would seem that the court's
authorities fall far short of establishing its statement that "if the Society
exists in violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act, . . . it, and the members
composing it, are not entitled to a decree for its benefit." 10
Viewed in the light of the general proposition that a statutory violation"'
is a clean hands defense, the court's statement fails to conform to the usual
judicial standards. Prefatory to such an invocation of a statutory wrong,
a defendant must prove that the wrong is directly connected with the matter
in suit.'.2 In addition, the defendant must show that the plaintiff's violation
has prejudiced him in some special way,la or that judicial relief would sanc-
tion or perhaps extend the plaintiff's illegal activities.Y4 Judged by these
standards, the violations with which the Society is charged should not bar
relief in equity. In the first place, even assuming argucndo that the Society's
alleged violations directly concerned the matter in suit, they cannot be said
to have prejudiced the state of W~rashington in any special way. Violation
of a federal statute does not ipso facto injure one of the several states. Fur-
thermore, if the Society's activities in Washington had been considered in
restraint of trade, presumably the Attorney General against whom the in-
junction was sought would have invoked the Washington anti-trust laws.Y5
In the second place, the district court would not necessarily be protracting
the Society's allegedly illegal activities by permitting it to challenge the
Washington statute, for a decision either sustaining or invalidating the statute
would but slightly affect the Society's nationwide activities.10
9. Keystone Driller Co. v. General FExcavator Co., 290 U. S. 240 (1933); see (1934)
1 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 649; Wheeler v. Sage, 1 Wall. 518 (U. S. 1863).
10. Buck v. Gallagher, 36 F. Supp. 405, 406 (W. D. Wash. 1940).
11. The clean hands defense has been invoked in the case of many types of statutory
violations. Strand Amusement Co. v. Owensboro, 47 S. NV. (2d) 710 (Ky. 1932) (Sun-
day law); Ad-Lee Co. v. Meyer, 294 Pa. 498, 144 At]. 540 (1928) (gambling); Cor-
nellier v. Haverhill Shoe MNfrs' Ass'n, 221 Mass. 554, 109 N. E. 643 (1915) (use of
illegal methods in strike).
12. Carpenters' Union v. Citizens' Committee, 333 Ill. 225, 164 N. E. 393 (1928);
World's Dispensary Med. Ass'n v. Pierce, 203 N. Y. 419, 96 N. . 738 (1911).
13. See Bentley v. Tibbals, 223 Fed. 247, 252 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915) ; Fuller v. Berger,
120 Fed. 274, 278 (C. C. A. 7th, 1903).
14. Ad-Lee Co. v. Mleyer, 294 Pa. 498, 144 Ad. 540 (1928); Portsmouth Brewing
Co. v. Portsmouth Brewing & Bottling Co., 67 N. H. 433, 30 Atl. 346 (1893).
15. 4 WASH. REv. STAT. § 2382 (Remington 1932).
16. See Cohn, supra note 6, at 410412.
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The considerations which move equity to deny use of the clean hands
defense in the case of an ordinary statutory violation become even more
significant where the Sherman Act is raised as the equitable defense. The
Sherman Act is an instrument designed to enable the Government to curb
monopolistic restraints through criminal 17 or equitable 8 proceedings and to
enable individuals to recover treble damages in private actions ;19 its exclu-
sive remedies include dissolution of illegal combinations but preclude the
confiscation of property. Hence, since a corporation convicted under the
Sherman Act does not lose its legal entity,20 in subsequent patent,21 trade-
mark,22 or copyright 23 infringement suits the courts have never permitted
infringing defendants to deprive the plaintiff-corporation of such property
rights by means of the clean hands defense.24 From this it follows that since
non-compliance with the Washington statute spelled forfeiture of the Society's
copyrights 25 - its major property rights- the same rule of law should have
governed the principal case.
Two exceptions, however, have been made to this settled rule against the
use of the Sherman Act as a clean hands defense. One is where the defend-
ant is able to show special damage apart from the damage suffered by the
general public as a result of the plaintiff's monopolistic practices- this
damage, of course, being directly connected with the right upon which the
plaintiff is suing.20 The second exception is where a contract in issue arises
out of the illegal combination. 27 Inasmuch as the principal case neither in-
volves a contract nor presents an issue of special damage to the defendant,
it is hardly possible to rely on these exceptions to the settled rule against the
use of the Sherman Act as a clean hands defense.
17. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-3 (1934).
18. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §4 (1934).
19. 26 STAT. 210 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1934).
20. Weyman-Bruton Co. v. Old Indian Snuff Mills, 197 Fed. 1015 (S. D. N. Y.
1912).
21. General Electric Co. v. Wise, 119 Fed. 922 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1903).
22. Searchlight Gas Co. v. Prest-o-Lite Co., 215 Fed. 692 (C. C. A. 7th, 1914).
23. Buck v. Newsreel, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 787 (D. Mass. 1938); M. Witmark & Sons
v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 Fed. 470 (E. D. S. C. 1924), aff'd, 2 F. (2d) 1020
(C. C. A. 4th, 1924) ; Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (E. D. Pa. 1922). All these cases
involved copyright infringement suits brought by the Society where the Sherman Act
defense was raised and denied.
24. Similarly, the courts have generally refused to permit the defense where the
specific performance of a contract was in issue in order, in the words of Mr. Justice
Holmes, "to prevent people from getting other people's property for nothing when they
purport to be buying it." Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight, 212 U. S. 227, 271
(1909).
25. 5 WASH. REv. STAT. §§ 3802-8 (Remington Supp. 1940).
26. See Radio Corp. of America v. Hygrade Sylvania Corp., 10 F. Supp. 879, 881-2
(D. N. J. 1934) ; Radio Corp. of America v. Majestic Distributors, 53 F. (2d) 641,
643 (D. Conn. 1931).
27. Compare Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight, 212 U. S. 227 (1909) with
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540 (1902). See MCCLINTOCK, E uITY
(1936) §24.
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In addition to the legal considerations which militate against the court's
decision in the principal case, the evidentiary methods by which the court
determined the Society's breach of the Sherman Act cast even stronger doubts
on the decision. Though a Sherman Act prosecution was pending against
the Society at the time of the instant proceeding,28 there was no prima face
case that the Society had violated the Act. In fact, even if there had been
a prior criminal conviction, it would not have been admissible under estab-
lished practice as conclusive evidence of the essential facts. Moreover, the
court could not presume a confession of guilt.30 Therefore, to prove the
completeness of the Society's monopoly, the court was compelled to fall back
on a statement of facts in another district court opinion,3' on the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Gibbs v. Buck,=2 and on the testimony of
the operators of two Washington radio broadcasting stations taken by a
special master.m In contrast to the voluminous evidence taken in the usual
anti-trust suit,34 this evidence was fragmentary and hardly of sufficient
probative value to justify a conclusion of violation of the statute. In fact,
it has been said that determinations of this nature are so highly questionable
that the clean hands defense should not apply in such cases.3 5
But aside from the inapplicability of the clean hands doctrine, the principal
case raises the collateral issue of whether the Society was accorded due process
28. The criminal prosecution, begun on August 30, 1934, vwas indefinitely postponed
by mutual consent of the parties in June, 1935. On Dec. 27, 1940, the Department of
Justice announced that it would begin new criminal proceedings against ASCAP, its
rival, Broadcast Music, Inc., and the two major networks, Columbia and National. Cohn,
supra note 6, at 407-8. A consent decree was consummated when ASCAP signed on
February 20, 1941. See (1941) 9 U. S. L. ,VEEK 2514.
29. See (1941) 50 YArx L. J. 409.
30. The Society argued before the court that its activities were not in violation of
the Sherman Act. Plaintiff's Reply Brief, pp. 15-17, Buck v. Gallagher, 36 F. Supp. 405
(W. D. Wash. 1940).
31. See Buck v. Swanson, 33 F. Supp. 377, 38 (D. Neb. 1939), where the court
said: "Of the popular music necessary for the successful operation of radio stations,
dance halls, hotels and theaters, the society has control of about 85% to 90% and also
has control of from 50% to 75% of the standard or older music that is played occasion-
ally." The court declared the Nebraska anti-ASCAP statute unconstitutional.
32. 307 U. S. 66, 82 (1939), where he said: ". . . [The Society's] power over the
business of musical rendition is so great that it can refuse to sell rights to single com-
positions, and can, and does, require purchasers to take, at a monopolistically fixed an-
nual fee, the entire repertory of all numbers controlled by the combination."
33. "In the instant case the testimony of the operators of two of the largest radio
broadcasting stations in Washington was that it would be impossible to operate such
stations without the music controlled by the Society. The Society has neither submitted
evidence, nor made argument to the contrary." Buck v. Gallagher, 36 F. Supp. 405, 405
(IV. D. 'Wash. 1940). But the court does not state for what purpose the evidence was
taken.
34. HA .ILTOx & TiLu, ANxrrRusr iN AcrIoz (TNEC Monograph No. 16, 1940)
58-74.
35. Anheuser-Bsch v. Cohen, 37 F. (2d) 393 (D. Md. 1930); Dallas v. Cluck &
Murphy, 234 S. NV. 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
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of law. By virtue of enormous penalties for violation of the statute, 80 the
Society under the rule in Ex parte Young 3 7 had a constitutional right to
challenge the validity of the statute without being subject to the penalties.
But the use of the clean hands defense effectively destroys the usefulness
of the protection afforded by the Young doctrine. Such an attempted circum-
vention was denounced by the Supreme Court in McFarland v. American
Sugar Refining Co.38 There the defense interposed to an attack on a state
statute aimed at a reputed monopoly of the complainant was that the com-
plainant had been convicted of a Sherman Act violation, The Court char-
acterized the statute as similar to a "bill of pains and penalties," because
"the statute was passed in view of the plaintiff's conduct, to meet it."80 Simi-
larly, in the principal case, the statute under attack was passed specifically
to combat ASCAP. The words of Mr. Justice Holmes in the McFarland
case seem, therefore, particularly apt. In speaking of the apparent connection
between the asserted defense and the purpose of the assailed statute, he
observed: "We deem it enough to say that neither that supposed connection
nor the general intimations of the plaintiff's wickedness in the answer deprive
it of its constitutional rights or prevent it from asserting them in the only
practicable and adequate way." 40
Apart from this constitutional issue, which in itself exemplifies an improper
use of the clean hands doctrine, the principal case may be said to represent
an unwarranted extension of this ancient doctrine.41 Since the doctrine was
never intended to punish litigants for their collateral crimes, it would seem
that use of Sherman Act violations as a clean hands defense - as in the case
of other statutory violations - should be restricted to situations where the
defendant has suffered some special damage or where to grant the plaintiff
a remedy would promote his illegal activities. Furthermore, in view of the
desirability of adequate proof in anti-trust litigation, it seems preferable
generally not to permit Sherman Act violations to be tried as a side issue.
Such sparing use of the Sherman Act as a clean hands defense would best
meet the demands of the Act and the functional limitations of the doctrine.
36. 5 WAsH. REv. STAT. § 3802-8 (Remington Supp. 1940) provides for forfeiture
of copyrights; 5 WASH. REv. STAT. § 3802-10 (Remington Supp. 1940) provides a file
not exceeding $500 or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, for each
violation.
37. 209 U. S. 123, 165 (1908). In Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U. S. 66. 77 (1939), the Court
held that the heavy penalties of the Florida anti-ASCAP statute entitled tie Society to
equitable relief under the rule in Ex parte Young.
38. 241 U. S. 79 (1916).
39. Id. at 85.
40. Ibid.
41. It should be stated, however, that sonic courts have occasionally gone far afield
in use of the clean hands defense and reached results as unorthodox as that of the prin-
cipal case. See, e.g., Knights of the K. K. K. v. Strayer, 34 F. (2d) 432 (C. C. A. 3d,
1929) ; American University v. Wood, 294 Il1. 186, 128 N. E. 330 (1920) ; A. N. Cham-
berlain Medicine Co. v. H. A. Chamberlain Medicine Co., 43 Ind. App. 213, 86 N. E.
1025 (1909).
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THE CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF TRUSTEES*
ADHERENCE to the ancient doctrine that trustees are personally liable on
trust contracts with third parties' has frequently resulted in judicial dis-
regard of the plain intention of trustee and contracting party. The trustee,
in the absence of an express disavowal of liability,2 has been held subject to
a judgment at law collectible from his personal property, although the third
party may have known that the contract was negotiated for the benefit of a
cestui, que trust and although the fiduciary may have signed in his represen-
tative capacity. The original purpose of thus imposing upon the trustee an
unintended liability was to grant the third party a remedy in a law court
which, refusing to recognize the trust device, would allow recovery only
against the trustee personally as the holder of legal title to the trust proip-
erty.3 Presently the rule is said to function to safeguard the beneficiary's
interest by imposing liability upon the trustee in the first instance and alluw-
ing the latter reimbursement only in an accounting.4
It is possible, of course, for the third party to reach the trust estate directly
in an equitable action. While no suit against the estate is cognizable at law,
equity has granted him direct relief on a theory of subrogation, allowing him
satisfaction to the extent of the trustee's right of indemnity from the trust
estate, and on a theory of unjust enrichment, providing him with relief meas-
ured by the benefit received by the trust estate from the transaction. He can
also obtain a decree forcing the trustee to apply trust property to the satis-
faction of the contractual obligation. These equitable actions,5 not exclu-
* East River Savings Bank v. 245 Broadway Corp., 284 N. Y. 470, 31 N. E. (2d)
906 (1940).
1. This doctrine is applied to administrators, executors, and guardians as well as to
trustees; to business trusts as well as personal trusts; to cases of inira sires as well as
ultra vires contracts; and has been accepted in a majority of United States jurisdictions.
Taylor v. Davis, 110 U. S. 330 (1884) ; O'Brien v. Jackson, 167 N. Y. 31, 60 N. E. 233
(1901); BoGER, TRUSTS (1935) §712; Scorr, TRusTs (1939) §262; RESTATsaI.NT,
TRUSTS (1935) § 262. This doctrine is hereinafter referred to as the strict rule of trus-
tee liability.
2. There are two ways in which a trustee may contract out of liability: (a) a
stipulation that the third party will look only to the trust estate; (b) an agreement that
the third party will look only to the trustee's right of indemnification from the trust
estate. The former, if valid, will give the third party an equitable remedy against the
estate, the latter a right in personam against the trustee. ScOTT, op. cit. supra note I,
§ 271; WARREN, CORPORATE AD VATAGES WITHOUT IxCoIOnRATION (1929) 854; W\LIuS-
TON, CoNTRAcTs (rev. ed. 1936) 915. That a trustee may so contract, see cases cited by
authorities stpra note 1.
3. 9 Ui,-oa.x LAWS ANNOTATED (Supp. 1940) 329; Stone, A Theory of Liability
of Trust Estates for the Contracts and Torts of the Trustee (1922) 22 C,,L L. REv.
527, 540; ScoTT, op. cit supra note 1, § 263. The common law did recognize a judgment
against an executor or administrator in his fiduciary capacity. WAr.EN, op. cit. supra
note 2, 853.
4. See Hussey v. Arnold, 185 Mass. 202, 70 N. E. 87 (1904); O'Brien v. Jackson,
167 N. Y. 31, 60 N. E. 238 (1901). Another function of the strict rule is Said to bz
security for the third party's interest. Betts v. Hackathorn, 159 Ark. 621, 252 S. W. 602
(1923); Taylor v. Davis, 110 U. S. 330 (1884).
5. These actions are fully discussed by ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 267 ct scq.
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sively available to the third party and unsatisfactory where the trust estate
is insolvent, substitute only infrequently for the typical direct suit against
the trustee personally.
The stringency of the doctrine which allows recovery against the trustee
personally in an action at law has been somewhat alleviated by equity courts
and trust settlors, each anxious to mitigate the obligations legally assumed
by a trustee upon acceptance of fiduciary duties. Curative relief is provided
in equity by the trustee's right of reimbursement from the trust estate when
the contract upon which he has been held is one made within the scope of
his authority for the cestui's benefit.0 This right may be negligible, how-
ever, if at time of suit the trust property is insufficient to furnish complete
reimbursement.7 Equally haphazard is the preventive relief provided by a
settlor's insertion within the trust indenture of an exculpatory clause prop-
erly defining the limits of the trustee's liability. This clause will exert no
protective force unless the trustee contracts in such manner as to put the
third party on notice of its existence.8
Opportunity to reconsider these established postulates was recently pre-
sented to the New York Court of Appeals in East River Savings Bank v.
245 Broadway Corporation.0 In 1927 Sophie Samuels established an irrevo-
cable trust of a single plot of mortgaged property for her own and her chil-
dren's benefit, naming four trustees, each of whom was a defendant in the
present action. By the declaration of trust, the trustees were expressly em-
powered further to mortgage the property; and a clause of the declaration
stated that "the trustees shall not receive any compensation for their services
but shall not be liable for any damage or otherwise, except for misconduct
or gross negligence." Within a year of their acceptance of the trust, the
trustees increased the first mortgage indebtedness by $30,000,10 the plaintiff
bank agreeing both to make the advance and to extend the time of the entire
loan. In every instrument concerned with this transaction, the defendants
identified themselves "as Trustees under a Deed of Trust dated . . . and
. . . recorded" and all signed in their representative capacity "as Trustees
above mentioned." In no instrument was there an express stipulation exempt-
ing the trustees from personal liability. Default having occurred, the plaintiff
bank, after judgment of foreclosure, sought a deficiency judgment against
6. United States v. Swope, 16 F. (2d) 215 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; Jessup v. Smith,
223 N. Y. 203, 119 N. E. 403 (1918) ; Sulzer's Estate, 323 Pa. 1, 185 At. 793 (1936) ;
Scott, Liabilities Incurred in the Administration of Trusts (1915) 28 HARV. L. REv. 725,
727; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 246.
7. See p. 1122 infra.
8. The weight to be given an exculpatory clause rests largely in the court's discre-
tion; the scope of the clause is generally strictly confined. Shinn, Exoncration Clauses in
Trust Iustruments (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 359; Shinn, Exculpatory Clauses in Personal
Trust Instruments, GA. B. J. (May 1940) 21. The scope of an exculpatory clause is
often confined by statute. See, e.g., N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 125.
9. 284 N. Y. 470, 31 N. E. (2d) 906 (1940).
10. The property was encumbered by a first mortgage of $250,000 and a second mort-
gage of $75,000, neither of which was assumed by the defendants. The second mortgage
was subordinated to the consolidated first mortgage and presented no issue to the court
in the instant case.
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the trustees personally. The Special Term of the Supreme Court, adhering
to the settled rule that in the absence of express disclaimer of liability trus-
tees are personally obligated on trust contracts irrespective of intentions not
to be bound, allowed the deficiency judgment against the defendants." The
Appellate Division affirmed. 12 The Court of Appeals held for the defend-
ants' 3 on the theory that the trustees as a class and not individually signed
contracts which, incorporating by reference pertinent provisions of the trust
declaration, placed plaintiff on notice of the trustees' restricted liability under
the exculpatory clause.
The opinion, thus primarily premised on the ground of exculpatory clause
exemption, seems unconvincing, for it depends upon a doubtful construction
of the clause. The court is apparently correct in stating that the plaintiff
bank was on notice of the trust declaration. The words of identification em-
ployed by defendants in the papers relating to the mortgage extension 14 would
seem to be sufficient reference to the trust declaration to place the bank on
notice of all its provisions, including the exculpatory clause.15 Moreover,
the court might have used the presumption that a trustee ordinarily has no
inherenf power to mortgage the trust estate, in order to impose upon the
bank as mortgagee an obligation to ascertain this authority when the mort-
gagor signed in a representative capacity. 16 Fulfillment of. this obligatiun
would have given notice to the bank of that clause authorizing a mortgage
11. Record on Appeal, p. 210, East River Savings Bank v. 245 Broadway Corp.,
284 N. Y. 470, 31 N. E. (2d) 906 (1940). The opinion by Judge Rosenman is unreported.
12. East River Savings Bank v. Samuels, 259 App. Div. 870, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) -64
(1st Dep't 1940). Previous to either of these decisions a motion by defendants to dis-
miss the complaint was denied. East River Savings Bank v. 245 Broadvay Corp., 170
Misc. 779, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 927 (Sup. Ct. 1939), af'd, 257 App. Div. 940, 13 N. Y. S.
(2d) 102 (1st Dep't 1939).
13. Defendants had premised their argument on intent. Brief for Defendants-Appel-
lants, pp. 7-23, East River Savings Bank v. 245 Broadway Corp., 284 X. Y. 470, 31 N. E.
(2d) 906 (1940). The settled rule served as the basis for plaintiff's argument. Brief for
Plaintiff-Respondent, pp. 8-23, East River Savings Bank v. 245 Broadway Corp., 284 N.
Y. 470, 31 N. E. (2d) 906 (1940). An argument similar to the plaintiff's was recently
made by counsel in Rothbart v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 30 N. E. (2d) 183, 185 (Ill.
App. 1940).
14. For purposes of exemption from trustee liability, the words used by defendants
would doubtless be deemed descriptio personac and of no legal effect. Duvall v. Craig,
2 Wheat. 45 (U. S. 1817). Any clause used must be clear and unequivocal: "as trustee"
will be considered purely descriptive but "as trustee and not individually" will allow
exemption. BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 1, § 714. The distinction so made has been criti-
cized. See VARRN, op. cit. supra note 2, 861. NEGOTAMBLE IN sTRU .TS Lm.w §N20
allows an exception in the case of bills and notes 'Which UniFoRM TRuSTs Acr § 12 pro-
poses to extend to all trust contracts. See p. 1124 infra.
15. James Stewart & Co. v. National Shauuut Bank, 75 F. (2d) 148 (C. C. A. 1st,
1935) (identifying words closely similar to those in the principal case); McGovern v.
Bennett, 146 Mich. 558, 109 N. W. 1055 (1906) ; cf. Peeples v. Enocks, 170 Miss. 472, 153
So. 796 (1934).
16. Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 382 (1868); Sternfels v. Watson, 139 Fed. 505 (C.
C. D. Ore. 1905) ; Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Miln, 209 Ill. App. 137 (1917) ; Boonr,
op. cit. supra note 1, § 766.
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by the trustees and, by inference, of all clauses of the trust declaration, in-
cluding the exculpatory provision. Under either view, however, it does not
necessarily follow that the exemption from liability is here applicable. The
exemption, appearing as it does with the compensatory provision, relates
only to an agreement between trustee and beneficiary. It contains no refer-
ence to strangers, usually included by the broad provisions of more accur-
ately drawn exoneration sections, 17 and should constitute no warning to the
bank that payment of the indebtedness would be forthcoming only from the
trust estate.18 Had the clause referred to third parties, the bank could have
maintained an action in equity against the trust estate.
Whatever its reasoning,19 the court did obtain a desirable result in sparing
the trustees pecuniary responsibility. Had the strict rule urged by the dissent
been applied, the uncompensated trustees would have suffered irreparable
loss, for their right to reimbursement terminated with the exhaustion of the
trust estate when the mortgage on the estate was foreclosed. Nor does the
result appear to place an undue burden on the bank, which was fully aware
of the nature of the mortgage transaction. The bank was careful to make
its checks payable to the defendants as trustees; it investigated the credit
standing of the trust, not the trustees; and it brought this action for the trus-
tees' personal liability only after amendment of its original complaint, which
sought recovery from the trust estate through the defendants as trustees. 0
In the light of these equities, a decision applying the strict rule of trustee
liability but allowing the trustees a reimbursement action against the cestuis,
as distinguished from the trust estate, would have been possible. Precedent
for thus relieving the trustees by a circuitous route could have been found
17. A carefully constructed exculpatory clause should include a provision that "all
having transactions with the trustees are on notice that the trustees are not personally
liable" or a similar provision. This is usually the case in business trust indentures. See
Baker v. James, 280 Mass. 43, 181 N. E. 861 (1932) ; Dolben v. Gleason, 292 Mass. 511,
198 N. E. 762 (1935). Such a provision may have no effect, however, if the exculpa-
tory clause also instructs the trustees to specify in each contract that the trust estate
alone shall incur liability and the trustees fail so to specify. Review Printing & Sta-
tionery Co. v. McCoy, 291 Ill. App. 524, 10 N. E. (2d) 506 (1937), (1938) 36 Mich.
L. REv. 1184.
18. It might well be argued that to give effect to the exculpatory clause in the prin-
cipal case is to bind a third person by a contract to which he was not a party. See Pum-
pelly v. Phelps, 40 N. Y. 59 (1869). But cf. Gwin v. Fountain, 159 Miss. 619, 126 So.
18 (1930).
19. Aside from the exculpatory clause, the court placed some emphasis on the fact
that the four trustees acted as a group and not individually. But the trustees could have
acted in no other way, for when the administration of a personal trust is vested in co-
trustees, matters requiring judgment and discretion must be effected by joint action.
See Colburn v. Grant, 181 U. S. 601, 606 (1901); Winslow v. Baltimore & 0. R. R.,
188 U. S. 646, 655 (1903); Brennan v. Willson, 71 N. Y. 502 (1877). Only in minis-
terial affairs, or where concert of performance is excused by statutory or trust provi-
sion, will the act of one of a group of cotrustees be binding. There was neither a statu-
tory nor a trust provision excusing joint action in the principal case.
20. Record on Appeal, pp. 201, 126, 7, East River Savings Bank v. 245 Broadway
Corp., 284 N. Y. 470, 31 N. E. (2d) 906 (1940).
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in a group of English cases 2 ' which afford the trustee an action in equity
against the beneficiary for indemnification when the former incurs liability
in the proper administration of the trust and his right to reimbursement is
frustrated by the insufficiency of the trust estate.? While the English cases
are premised upon the equitable maxim that he who reaps the benefits bears
the burdens, a contractual theory-inferring a promise by the cestui to re-
imburse the trustee-is available when, as here, a beneficiary of the trust is
also its settlor.2
No American court, however, has specifically accepted these English
cases,24 and there are dicta indicating that a theory placing a burden of reim-
bursement upon the cestui is untenable in this country.2 5 This notion is based,
not so much on the fact that the function of the trust device is to preserve
unimpaired the beneficiary's interest, as on the restrictive view that since
the trustee may disclaim personal liability either upon acceptance of the trust
or at the time of contracting with a third party, failure so to disclaim forces
full responsibility upon him.2 6 An additional basis for this conclusion is the
practical consideration that the trustee, by being in control of the trust estate,
always has the means of risk avoidance entirely within his hands. A trustee's
suit for reimbursement against a cestui may also be defeated by recognition
of the lack of control exercised by the cestui, a factor which prevails in the
21. Balsh v. Hyham, 2 P. Vms. 453, 24 Eng. Rep. 810 (1728); Phene v. Gilan,
5 Hare 1, 67 Eng. Rep. 803 (1845) ; Ex parte Chippendale, 4 DeG. M. & G. 19, 54, 43
Eng. Rep. 415, 428 (1854) ; In re The Exhall Coal Co., 35 Beav. 449, 55 Eng. Rep. 970
(1866) ; In re National Financial Co., 3 Ch. App. 791 (1868) ; Hardoon v. Belilios, [1901]
A. C. 118, 14 HARv. L. Rnv. 539; Matthews v. Ruggles-Brise, [1911] 1 Ch. 194. None
of these cases, however, involved a typical testamentary or inter ziros trust; all %vere
concerned with trusts for business purposes.
22. The English doctrine is not without exception: trustees of an unincorporated
club have been held to have no right to reimbursement from the club members. Wise
v. Perpetual Trustee Co., Ltd. [1903] A. C. 139, noted (1903) 3 COL. L Rnv. 407; Wil-
liams, Club Trustees' Right to Indeninity: 4 Criticism of IVise v. Perpetual Trustee
Co., Ltd. (1903) 19 L. Q. REv. 386; Book Review (1903) 17 Htmv. L REV. 141.
23. See Scott, mpra note 6, 728. In the case of business trusts, by definition, it is
usual for the cestuis to be the settlors. WAMEN, op. cit. mSpra note 2, 328. See Poland
v. Beal, 192 Mass. 559, 78 N. E. 728 (1906).
24. And the authorities are in conflict over the English doctrine. In favor of the
doctrine: BoGERT, op. cit. supra note 1, § 718; PERY, TnusTs ANm TRUSTas (7th ed.
1929) § 485. Against the doctrine: Scorr, op. cit. supra note 1, § 262; Loan;a, A Tans-
Tf's HANDBOOK (Shattuck Rev. 1940) 241. Caveat: RKSTATE UE T, Tausrs (1935)
§265.
25. See Blewitt v. Olin, 14 Daly 351, 355 (N. Y. 1888) ; Roger Williams Nat. Bank
v. Groton Mfg. Co., 16 R. I. 504, 508, 17 At. 170, 171 (1889) ; Coffman v. Gates, 110
Mo. App. 475, 489, 85 S. W. 657, 661 (1905); McIntyre & Wardwell v. Williamson,
72 Vt. 183, 184, 47 Ad. 786 (1900). There are also some dicta to the contrary. See
Truesdale v. Philadelphia Trust, Safe Deposit & Ins. Co., 63 Minn. 49, 51, 65 N. W.
133, 135 (1895); Wells-Stone Mercantile Co. v. Grover, 7 N. D. 460, 464, 75 N. NV.
911, 912 (1898); Wells-Stone Mercantile Co. v. Aultman, Miller & Co., 9 N. D. 520,
527, 84 N. NV. 375, 379 (1900).
26. See especially LoPIG, op. cit. supra note 24, at 241; Roger Williams Nat. Bank
v. Groton Mfg. Co., 16 R. I. 504, 508, 17 AU. 170, 171 (1889).
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law of partnership.2 7 Further objections to the English doctrine's allocation
of reimbursement risk on the beneficiary lie in its circuity and also in its
ineffectiveness in those instances where the cestui, as well as the trust estate,
is without funds.
The shortcomings of the English doctrine and, at the same time, the diffi-
culties inherent in rigid application of the strict rule of trustee liability,20
may be obviated by a greater readiness on the part of courts to find from
ambiguous exculpatory clauses and contracts omitting express disclaimers
of liability an intent to avoid personal liability.2 9 Had the court in the prin-
cipal case accepted the argument of defendants, this attitude would have been
established in New York and the strict rule, whose inflexible character ig-
nores the practical realities of trust administration, would have been repudi-
ated. The scope of intent, now only as broad as a trustee's contractual stipu-
lations against liability, could thus have been extended not only to encom-
pass a greater effective range but also to shift the risk currently placed on
trustee to trust estate and third party. This broader view of intent already
obtains in the field of negotiable instruments through Section 20 of the N.
I. L., which deems a trustee prima facie not liable when he signs in his rep-
resentative capacity and discloses his principal. This section was drafted to
counteract judicial doctrines at variance with mercantile usage8 0 By Section
12(3) of the Uniform Trusts Act, now adopted in two states,3 1 the policies
in respect to bills and notes are extended to all trust contracts.0 2 Present
business practice appears to call for this less stringent rule. It is difficult to
believe that a business man contracting with a trustee, who discloses his ca-
pacity but does not disclaim personal liability, immediately relies on the in-
dividual resources of the trustee, rather than on the estate.
The establishment of this practical view of intent and the repudiation of
the strict rule of trustee liability appear inevitable, for the ancient doctrine
27. Frost v. Thompson, 219 Mass. 360, 365, 106 N. E. 1009, 1010 (1914) ; MEcumt,
PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1920) § 98.
28. The strict rule has been judicially criticized. See Germania Bank v. Michaud,
62 Minn. 459, 465, 65 N. W. 70, 72 (1895) ; Jones Brewing Co. v. Flaherty, 80 N. 1-1.
571, 572, 120 Ati. 432, 433 (1923) ; Hamilton v. Young, 116 Kan. 128, 132, 225 Pac. 1045,
1046 (1924) ; Printup v. Trammel, 25 Ga. 240, 242 (1857).
29. There are decisions intimating such an attitude. See those cited in Brief for
Defendants-Appellants, pp. 7-12, East River Savings Bank v. 245 Broadway Corp., 284
N. Y. 470, 31 N. E. (2d) 906 (1940) ; ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 263, 271A.1. Parol
evidence may be introduced to describe the circumstances attendant upon the negotiations
and execution of a written instrument. RICHARDSON, EVWDENC (4th ed. 1931) § 444.
30. See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (6th ed. 1938) 295-300, 312-316.
.Trustees are included within the section's ambit by the words "or in a representative
capacity."
31. LA. GEN. STATS. (Dart, 1939) § 9850.52(3); N. C. CODE (1939) § 4 035(o) (3).
A similar view appears to prevail in Illinois by virtue of judicial decision. Empire Fire
Proofing Co. v. Comstock, 121 Ill. App. 518 (1905) ; O'Connell v. Horwieh, 284 Ill. App.
554, 1 N. E. (2d) 231 (1936).
32. The section provides that "the addition of the word 'trustee' or the words 'as
trustee' after the signature of a trustee to a contract shall be deemed prima facie evi-
dence of an intent to exclude the trustee from personal liability."
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has now outgrown its former usefulness and continuous application contra-
venes present day policies. The amalgamation of law and equity has de-
stroyed the initial function of the strict rule-to grant to the contracting
third party a remedy in a court of law which refused to recognize the trust
device.tm Those courts, moreover, which continue to adhere to the strict rule
as security for the beneficiary's interest fail to realize that, upon adoption of
the more practical rule, the cestui would still have an action for breach of
trust in the case of an unauthorized contract 4 and that, where the contract
is properly negotiated, the beneficial interest requires no protection.-I Fur-
thermore, the strict rule, by affording the contracting third party indemnity
from two sources-the property of trust and trustee-unduly favors the third
party in an arm's length transaction. In view of these considerations, no rea-
son appears to compel rigid adherence to the strict rule.
LATERAL SUPPORT FOR EXISTING BUILDINGS DURING
NEW CONSTRUCTION*
IN urban communities excavation of ground below the foundation depth
of adjoining buildings necessitates lateral support of foundation walls by
shoring or underpinning. The bulk of decisions concerning lateral support
have been directed at fixing the damage liability for injuries arising from
inadequate support. Comparatively little regard has been given to the prob-
lem of designing affirmative rules to compel the party legally responsible for
damages to take precautionary measures so that no building injury can -occur.
In attempting to solve the problem of liability courts have used two essen-
tially different sets of legal doctrines-the "natural right" doctrines of prop-
erty and the more flexible negligence doctrines of tort law. Originally
"property" law exclusively governed the imposition of all liability for
injury both to land and buildings. The courts, following a seventeenth cen-
tury dictum,1 charged all excavators with absolute liability for damage to
adjacent land in its natural condition but placed the loss from damage caused
by the removal of additional support necessary for buildings un the building
owner himself.2 In an era when the abundance of land and the relatively
33. See p. 1119 mpra; Stitzer v. Whittaker, 3 Neb. Unof. 414, 91 N. XV. 713 (1902).
34. This action would, of course, be dependent on the trustee's financial position.
35. By definition, that which the trustee does, within the scope of his authority, is
done for the beneficiary's interest. Section 12(2) of the U.moRm TRUsTs AcT allows
the beneficiary to intervene in an action against the trustee as trustee in order to object
to collection from the trust estate.
* Braun v. Hamack, 206 Minn. 572, 289 N. W. 553 (1940).
1. Wilde v. Mfinsterley, 2 RolL Abr. 564 (1639) ; see (1929) 15 Conx. L Q. 123.
2. Obert v. Dunn, 140 Mfo. 476, 41 S. AV. 901 (1897); Schaefer v. Hoffman, 193
Wis. 233, 223 N. XVr. 847 (1929) ; see 3 TIFF zy, PnorERTv (3d ed. 1939) §§ 752, 753;
(1929) 15 IowA L. REv. 88; (1937) 15 N. C. L. Rav. 394. In some jurisdictions the abso-
lute right to the lateral support of land may be lost where the superimposed weight of
buildings increases the necessity of lateral support. Smith v. Stolle, 77 S. W. (2d) 521
(Mo. App. 1934).
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small size of buildings made lateral support for neighboring structures nor-
mally unnecessary, this rule was satisfactory. Its inequity in a modern so-
ciety, however, where heavy buildings are often constructed contiguous with
adjoining property lines3 has necessitated exceptions within the field of
property law ;4 the excavator, for example, has been held liable for building
injury where the soil in its natural state would have fallen even without
the superimposed weight of the buildings.
Tort doctrines have been used to greater effect in imposing responsibility
upon the excavator,0 placing on him in some cases the duty to shore adjoining
buildings during excavation.7 Though most courts generally refuse to impose
such an unqualified tort liability,8 many have supported jury verdicts against
excavators whose failure to protect adjoining buildings was so obviously
negligent as to make the fall of a building certain.0 Thus used, the concept
of negligence has great flexibility in determining whether an excavator may
be held for injury to adjoining buildings; and if this concept were combined
with a flexible application of contributory negligence, which as yet has under-
gone comparatively little development in this field,' 0 the absolute manner
3. It has been said that a landowner may not, by building a massive superstructure
on his own land, substantially increase the cost of his neighbor's subsequent excavation,
See Neyman v. Pincus, 82 Mont. 467, 487, 267 Pac. 805, 810 (1928). It may be said with
equal validity, however, that a man may not, by excavating to a great depth on his own
land, put his neighboring building owner to the great expense of shoring up his property.
Canfield Rubber Co. v. Leary, 99 Conn. 40, 49, 121 Atl. 283, 286 (1923) ; see Note (1927)
50 A. L. R. 486, 489.
4. A person excavating contiguous to a party wall for the purpose of building a
new wall must insure the adjoining owner against damage to the party wall. Christen-
sen v. Mann, 187 Wis. 567, 596, 204 N. W. 499, 509 (1925). The right to adjoining
support for party walls has been held to arise either by grant or prescription. Carroll
Blake Constr. Co. v. Boyle, 140 Tenn. 166, 173, 203 S. W. 945 (1918). The existence
of a party wall by grant has been sufficiently supported by evidence that the adjoin-
ing lands with the wall were conveyed by a common owner to the excavator and the
adjoining owner. Nippert v. Warneke, 128 Cal. 501, 61 Pac. 96 (1900). A case similar
in fact and legal result occurs where a building and lands have been conveyed by a com-
mon owner to one party and adjacent lands to another. Durante v. Alba, 266 Pa. 444,
446, 109 Atl. 796 (1920).
5. Prete v. Gray, 49 R. I. 209, 141 At. 609 (1928), 77 U. oF PA. L. Rsv. 405
(1929).
6. S. H. Kress & Co. v. Reaves, 85 F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936); Hannicker
v. Lepper, 20 S. D. 371, 107 N. W. 202 (1906).
7. Canfield Rubber Co. v. Leary, 99 Conn. 40, 50, 121 At. 283, 286 (1923); Mas-
sell Realty Improvement Co. v. MacMillan Co., 168 Ga. 164, 147 S. E. 38 (1929).
8. Jones v. Hacker, 104 Kan. 187, 190, 178 Pac. 424, 426 (1906) ; Horowitz v. Blay,
193 Mich. 493, 160 N. W. 438 (1916) ; see Christensen v. Mann, 187 Wis. 567, 584, 204
N. W. 499, 505 (1925).
9. Hartshorn v. Tobin, 244 Mass. 334, 138 N. E. 805 (1923) (deep excavation in
friable soil) ; Diksajtsz v. Brosz, 104 Pa. Super. 246, 158 Atd. 620 (1932). The assump-
tion of the burden of shoring by an excavator places on him a duty of shoring with due
care. Collias v. Detroit & N. Mich. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 220 Mich. 207, 189 N. W. 866
(1922).
10. 6 RESTATEm-NT, ToRTs, EXPLANATORY Noms (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1925) 101.
Some courts have held that an infirm condition of adjoining buildings does not constitute
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in which even present property doctrines operate irrespective of the varying
situations could be supplanted. The risk of building injury can be placed
equitably only by reference to some specified standard of land utilization to
which all landowners will be held. The party, excavator or owner, not using
his property in the specified desirable manner must assume the risks of
building injury. In view of the current intense but varying land uses, the
flexible tort doctrines indicate a more realistic solution to the problem of
assigning responsibility than either anachronistic and absolute property rules
based on a natural use of land, or their absolute exceptions."
Tort procedure, though more desirable than the property concepts, is not,
however, completely satisfactory because of its uncertain operation.
12 Some
attempt to avoid both the uncertainties of tort law and the inadequacies of
placing absolute liability on either building owner or excavator under prop-
erty doctrines has been made through statutes which set an arbitrary excava-
tion depth as the point at which the loss in building damage shifts from
building owner to the excavator.13 Though framed vith reference to the
customary use of land, such statutes may prove unsatisfactory even to effect
this standard since they are invariably statewide in application; the customary
depth of foundations may vary greatly between different cities, because of
the hardness of the soil or the size of the buildings. Recognition and effect
have been given to these local differences, however, by the use of municipal
ordinances to set the critical building depth.1 4 Often these local regulations
contributory negligence on the owner's part, but rather imposes a greater degree of care on
the excavator. Bass v. West, 110 Ga. 698, 36 S. E. 244 (1900); Walker v. Strosnider,
67 IV. Va. 39, 60, 67 S. E. 1087, 1096 (1910). But cf. Canfield Rubber Co. v. Leary, 99
Conn. 40, 50, 121 AtI. 283, 287 (1923) (duty of owner to protect himself when he cannot
reasonably expect the excavator to do so).
11. The American Law Institute pictures the law of lateral support as growing out
of two different theories of property law-i.e., that the right to support is either a
"natural easement" or a "right to the integrity of land." 4 REsTAT=,1:,r, ToRs (1939)
185-186. From each of these the Institute has "deduced" a different group of five legal
results. The concepts and their logical implications are of little value, however, in
analyzing the cases, in arguing for a particular result in a given case, or in determining
what is a desirable result, since the circularity of these terms permits a similar result
under either. The Institute has made little inquiry into determining a sound reason for
supporting property law rules and has not considered the desirability of supplanting
property law with the more flexible tort doctrines.
12. Such uncertainty makes it impossible to determine in advance on whom the
loss for damaged buildings lies so that such person may be forced to take precautionary
measures; and the vicissitudes of a jury trial give no assurance that all land owners .,ill
be held either to the same or even to a desirable standard of land utilization.
13. CAL. CmVuL CODE (Deering, 1937) §832 (12 feet); OHIO CODE A N. (Page,
1938) §§ 3782, 3783 (9 feet); see (1937) 15 N. C. L. REv. 394, 396, n. 22.
14. CLEVELAND MUN. CODE (1924) § 1535(c)(d) (nine feet); Los ANGELsS Mu:;.
CODE (1936) §91.149 (twelve feet); PITTSaURGH Mu. DIG. (1938) §923(2) (fifteen
feet). In some cities the burden shifts not only if the actual depth of the foundation ex-
ceeds the set limit, but also if there is an intention in the building plans to exceed this
depth. Nw HAVEN BLDG. CODE (1925) § 18 (1) (2); Foster v. Zampieri, 140 App. Div.
471, 125 N. Y. S. 422 (1910) (ordinance of City of New York). In a few citics the
112719411 NOTES
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
provide an additional refinement by fixing one depth at which the burden
shifts for a dwelling house and another for a business structure.
10 More-
over, some ordinances, concerned primarily with distributing the cost of
shoring, make an excavator responsible only where the adjoining foundation
walls have been extended to the specified depth limit by the owner.
10 Prob-
ably a more complete method of imposing the responsibility for lateral sup-
port, and a method toward which these ordinances point, would be their
control by local planning commissions which could lay down rules for each
city, assessing the burden with reference to the depth of foundations in dif-
ferent areas and with reference to the kind of land use which it is desirable
to keep at a low cost. The most satisfactory solution to the problem of lateral
support, however, probably lies in long range land use planning in which
congested cities will disappear.
If an excavator is to be held liable for failure to provide temporary sup-
port for adjoining buildings, it is not difficult to compel him to take ade-
quate precautionary measures to protect buildings adjoining excavations.
Thus, some courts have put a positive preventive duty on the excavator by
enjoining at the request of the building owner an attempt by the former
to excavate without providing lateral support.17 A similar result is obtained
by the revocation of the excavator's building permit by a municipal officer
acting under a local building code.' 8
Such a facile solution for the problem of inducing affirmative action to
prevent building injuries becomes inoperative when the liability shifts to the
adjoining owner. To some extent withholding damages from an owner for
injury to his own property and assessing damages against him for injury
to the excavator caused by the building's collapse' 0 will induce preventive
action. Some owners, however, may prefer to take an unreasonable risk of
not shoring their buildings.20 As a recent case illustrates, the courts have
entire burden of support is on the excavator. BALTIMORE CITY CODE (1928) art. 3,
§ 22(4) ; TULSA BLDG. CODE (1931) § 207(b). In almost all situations, however, the duty
of support will remain with the owner unless he gives the excavator license to enter his
premises. BALTioRE CITY CODE (1928) art. 3, §§ 14(11), 22(6). CINCINNATI BLDG.
CODE (1933) § 1900-5. A few ordinances give the excavator an absolute right of entry
to adjoining property. TULSA BLDG. CODE §207(b). Notice of an intended excavation
is usually necessary, as at common law, to create any duty of the building owner to pro-
tect his own property. BUFFALO ORD. (1939) c. XII, § 72.
15. SPOKANE GEN. ORD. (1928) ord. C1891, § 67 (six and twelve feet).
16. BUFFALO ORD. (1939) c. XII, § 72; CLEVELAND MUN. CODE (1924) § 1534(d);
Los ANGELES MUN. CODE (1936) § 91.149. Ordinances shifting to the excavator the
total burden of protecting a house with inadequate foundations may be quite inequitable.
See Triulzi v. Costa, 296 Mass. 24, 4 N. E. (2d) 617 (1936) (Boston ordinance).
17. See, e.g., Massell Realty Improvement Co. v. MacMillan Co., 168 Ga. 164, 147
S. E. 38 (1929) (successful suit for injunction).
18. See BIRMINGHAm GEN. CODE (1930) §301; Los ANGELES MUN. CODE (1936)
§ 91.05; NEw HAvEN BLDG. CODE (1923) § 7(7) ; Triulzi v. Costa, 296 Mass. 24, 4 N. E.
(2d) 617 (1936).
19. Davis v. Sap, 20 Ohio App. 180, 152 N. E. 758 (1922) ; Eggert v. Kullmann, 204
Wis. 60, 234 N. W. 349 (1931).
20? See, e.g., Obert v. Dunn, 140 Mo. 476, 41 S. W. 901 (1897) (destruction of
$6000 building because $12 instead of $126 precautionary expense was incurred).
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refused to compel the building owner to shore his property in accordance
with general building standards.2' The excavation of the plaintiff had caused
the ground under defendant's house to begin to slip away. Upon investiga-
tion the building inspector of Minneapolis determined that the defendant's
building, contrary to the city building code, had no foundations. Pursuant
to his authority to declare buildings unsafe or in contravention of the pro-
visions of the building ordinances,2 2 he ordered defendant to build proper
foundations for the house. Upon the latter's refusal the plaintiff-excavatur,
in order to insure the safety of his own work, was compelled to build the
foundations, and attempted to recover their cost from the adjoining o~wner.
In denying recovery the court reasoned that though the owner himself could
recover no damages from the excavator, to whom in fact he was under a
potential liability, still the owner could not be compelled to protect his own
property2 3 Since there was no duty,24 there could be no implied request for
the excavator's expense and, therefore, no quasi-contractual recovery. A
similar result in favor of the owner would presumably have followed an
attempt of the excavator to obtain a mandatory injunction directing the owner
to protect his own property.
The court's argument that there can be no recovery because there is nA
duty is unconvincingly circular; the building owner has no duty only if the
excavator may not recover the expense of providing foundations. Such a
conclusion rests on an assumption that protection of property is of concern
only to the owner,25 and denies any social interest in the preservation ,,f
existing structures. The courts themselves have adopted a contrary view in
analogous fields where they continually reassert the desirability of rules tend-
ing to increase new construction,20 and the same policy should favor protec-
21. Braun v. Hamack, 206 'inn. 572, 289 N. W. 553 (1940).
22. MiNEAsrous BsxG. CODE (1934) §§ 107, 110.
23. The court said explicitly only that the plaintiff was a volunteer; but his classi-
fication under this status necessarily implies that the owner had no duty to protect his
own property and prevent injury to others. The court's view seemed to be motivated
by the inequity of granting the excavator damages for an expense occasioned by his own
activity. See (1940) 24 MirN. L. REv. 852; (1940) 88 U. oF PA. L. Rtzv. 1020. Such
a repudiation of the strict common law rule of placing the burden of temporary support
on the owner could be much more desirably effected by placing a duty of support on the
excavator directly.
24. There have been similar holdings in other jurisdictions. First NaL Bank v. Vil-
legra, 92 Cal. 96 (1891) ; Korogodsky v. Chimberoff, 256 Ill. App. 255 (1930); Flana-
gan Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Levine, 142 Mo. App. 242, 125 S. W. 1172 (1910). Where, how-
ever, there has been immediate danger to the lives of the excavator's workmen, the ex-
cavator has recovered his costs. Ceffarrelli v. Landino, 82 Conn. 126, 72 At. 564 (1969) ;
see Flanagan Bros. Mlfg. Co. v. Levine, supra at 247, 125 S. W. at 1173. Though the
court in the principal case thus asserted the contractor's ability to recover for the shor-
ing or underpinning during an "unavoidable urgency," it in fact denied recovery where
the facts would have justified such a finding.
25. Korogodsky v. Chimberoff, 256 Ill. App. 255 (1930); NVeisberger v. Maurer, 9
N. J. Misc. 117, 120 (1931), aff'd on lower court opinion, 109 N. J. Law 273, 160 At.
634 (1932).
26. See CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTEREsTS W icu RU.N NVrrn L%z
(1929) 58.
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tion of existing structures. Even aside from any question of the wisdom of
putting a common law duty on an owner to protect his own property, the
municipal duty imposed by the building inspector's order in the principal case
should have been conclusive in allowing recovery.27 This the court ignored
in the face of a strong dissent.
2 8
Express ordinances in some municipalities are available to prevent the
result of the principal case. These ordinances impose a duty on the adjoin-
ing building owner similar to that imposed by the building inspector's order
in the principal case. They direct variously that the building owner "shall
support and protect" his walls "so as to preserve" them "safe and secure,"20
that he "shall protect and underpin" his walls "so that they shall be and re-
main as safe as before such excavation was commenced," 3 0 or that he "shall
preserve and protect" his building "by proper foundations."131  To insure
performance of this duty by a recalcitrant building owner, various sanc-
tions are provided. The most extreme are stipulations that the excavator
after ten days notice shall shore up the building and recover his expense
from the owner; 32 other ordinances provide that after either 24 or 48 hours
notice the city building inspector may take any necessary measures to pro-
tect the building.33 In the latter case either the city or any person, including
the excavator, who shores the owner's property under the inspector's direc-
tion may recover from the owner in the same manner as if tile owner had
requested the work. Finally, other ordinances give a right to shore and re-
cover only to the city. Though this may necessitate an additional crew of
workmen for some excavations, it does provide adequate protection for the
building owner's property.3 4
Though these municipal procedures may adequately forestall building in-
jury, there is danger that a court intent on protecting a building owner's
right to the delapidation of his own property may declare them void. In
passing ordinances a municipal corporation has only those powers impliedly
or expressly granted it by the legislature or the state constitution, 5 and some
courts have held that municipal corporations may change the common law
only where the specific change has been authorized by legislative enabling acts
27. Weisberger v. Maurer, 9 N. J. Misc. 117, 120 (1931), aff'd on lower court opfit-
ion, 109 N. J. Law 273, 160 At. 634 (1932) (a duty imposed by an ordinance was simi-
larly overlooked).
28. See Braun v. Hamack, 206 Minn. 572, 575, 289 N. W. 553, 555 (1940).
29. PInTSBURGH MUN. DIG. (1938) § 923(2); see also BUFFALO ORDINANCES (1939)
c. XII, § 72; ST. Louis REv. CODE ANN. (1938) § 4670.
30. NEW HAvEx BLDG. CODE (1925) § 18(1); SPOKANE GEN. ORD. (1928) ord.
C1891, § 67.
31. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK (1938) §26-385.0(b); see
also CLEVELAND MUN. CODE (1924) § 1535(c).
32. See Newman v. Pasternack, 103 N. J. Law 434, 135 Atl. 877 (1927).
33. CLEVELAND MUN. CODE (1924) § 1537; Nnv HAVEN BLDG. CODE (1925) § 19(4);
NEW YORK ORD. ANN. (Baldwin, 1936) c. V, § 230(5).
34. BUFFALO ORD. (1939) c. XII, §72; PIrTSBURGH MuN. DIG. §§923(4), 881 (re-
quires an action in Common Pleas Court previous to action by the city) ; SPOKANE GEN.
ORD. (1928) ord. C1891, § 67.
35. 2 MCQuILLAN, MUNICIPAL COR'ORATIONS (2d ed. 1939) § 708.
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or constitutional provision.30 Such a view prohibits a common law change
under either implied grants of power or general grants empowering a muni-
cipality to enact laws inconsistent with state policy. Thus, some courts have
declared void a municipal ordinance attempting to shift common law liability
for building injury from owner to excavator at a specified excavation depth,
even when under legislative grant the municipality could provide all build-
ing regulations necessary to protect health and safety.37 In a similar man-
ner, where ordinances change common law by imposing a positive duty on
adjoining building owners, they may be construed as void in the absence
of an express legislative enabling act.
The general validity of the rule requiring an express grant of power to
change the common law is, however, open to doubt.38 Whenever express
legislative grant is found unnecessary, the power to pass an ordinance im-
posing a public duty of self-protection on building owners may easily be
premised on the usual legislative grant to municipalities to "provide for the
safe construction, inspection and repair of all private and public buildings
within the city." 3 Even in the absence of this general enabling clause a city
usually has the additional power to provide ordinances necessary to the gen-
eral municipal welfare ;40 and though the community value in an equitable
incidence of excavation costs may be questionable, its stake in the main-
tenance of private structure in a safe condition is clear.
So far as prevention of social waste is concerned, the immediate desir-
ability of rules to insure building protection seems apparent, especially
where the burden of the prevention is on a recalcitrant building owner. To
some extent courts can protect such an owner's property by awarding an ex-
cavator his expense in providing the necessary underpinning and shoring.
Probably the most effective solution to the problem, however, lies in munici-
pal regulations under which an unbiased municipal officer may, in the event
of the owner's refusal to act, determine both the necessary precautionary
measures and the most desirable means of carrying them out at the owner's
expense.
36. Carroll Blake Const. Co. v. Boyle, 140 Tenn. 166, 179, 203 S. AV. 945, 948 (1918);
Hickman v. Wellaurer, 169 Wis. 18, 24, 171 N. W. 635, 638 (1919).
37. Carpenter v. Reliance Realty Co., 103 Mo. App. 480, 77 S. W. 1004 (1903);
Young v. Mall Inv. Co., 172 Minn. 428, 215 N. W. 840 (1927). But cf. Bergen v. Mor-
ton Amuse. Co., 178 App. Div. 400, 165 N. Y. S. 348 (1917), aff'd, 226 N. Y. 665, 123
N. .. 855 (1919); McDaniel Bros. v. Wilson, 45 S. W. (2d) 293 (Tem. Civ. App. 1931)
(assumption of ordinance's validity).
38. McKelley v. Murfreesboro, 162 Tenn. 304, 309, 36 S. W. (2d) 99, 100 (1931)
(rule held not infringed where its application was undesirable) ; cf. Matter of McIntosh
v. Johnson, 211 N. Y. 265, 105 N. E. 414 (1914).
39. See Carpenter v. Reliance Realty Co., 103 Mo. App. 480, 494, 77 S. W. 104
(1903) (Charter of St. Louis).
40. See Bergen v. Morton Amuse. Co., 178 App. Div. 400, 165 N. Y. S. 348 (1917),
aff'd, 226 N. Y. 665, 123 N. E. 855 (1919).
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